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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a small thing: the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) limits the
punishment a tribal court can impose to no more than a fine and a
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year in jail.1 Our system gives that much power to municipalities,
including every little speed-trap town. Speeding tickets can be costly,
and you can go to jail if you don't pay them. No oAe asks whether you
had the right to participate in making those laws. It's just the way it
is.
It is a great thing: the individual rights guaranteed to citizens
under the Constitution or fidelity to promises made long ago, the right
of a people to be recognized as sovereign, a moment of respect in a long
and continuing history of conquest and colonialism.
The ambivalence of the federal government to the sovereignty of
native tribes is ordinarily a quiet fact of life in this country. Now, the
federal circuits have disturbed that quiet by rendering opposing rul-
ings on the question whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars succes-
sive tribal/federal prosecution of nonmember Indians 2 in Indian
Country.3 The Ninth Circuit has held the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not present a bar to successive tribal/federal prosecutions.4 In
contrast, the Eighth Circuit has held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits subsequent prosecution because the source of the tribe's ju-
risdiction, if it has jurisdictional power, is the same as the source of
the federal courts'. 5 The circuit split has far reaching practical conse-
1. Until 1986, the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) limited the penalty that tribal
courts could impose to no more than 6 months in jail plus a $500 fine. 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(7) (1986). Currently, the limits under ICRA are $5,000 and one year in
jail. Id.
2. The courts use the term "nonmember Indians" to refer to those individuals on
tribal land who meet the legal definition of "Indian" in at least one context, but
are not registered as members of the tribe where the individual is being prose-
cuted. See infra note 14 and accompanying text. The term distinguishes these
Indians from both Indians who are members, and from non-Indians generally.
3. "Indian Country" is the term used to demarcate the physical borders ofjurisdic-
tion. The term is statutorily defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as,
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the juris-
diction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance
of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the
reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extin-
guished, including rights of way running through the same.
4. United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001).
5. United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 982
(2003).
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quences,6 and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on
the issue. 7
Beyond practical consequences, however, are the doctrinal and the-
oretical effects. Indian law scholar Frank Pommsersheim has called
this circuit split "the (little or not so little) constitutional crisis."8 Like
so many Indian law cases, one case becomes a microcosm for the In-
dian law universe by raising the fundamental questions: What are the
limits of tribal sovereignty? Where is the source of tribal sovereignty?
Who decides the answers to those questions?
Analyzing the sovereignty question requires a multifaceted inquiry
into several complex bodies of law.9 The Double Jeopardy Clause of
the United States Constitution forbids multiple prosecutions based on
the same facts.1o The dual sovereignty exception to the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause allows successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns, or
more precisely, sovereigns that derive power from separate sources.1 '
Thus, the Court must determine whether tribes have inherent sover-
eignty over nonmember Indians or have sovereignty only as derived
from a delegation by the federal government. 1 2 If it is an inherent
power, retained by the tribe from the days before the United States
existed, the dual sovereignty exception will apply, allowing multiple
prosecutions. If it is a power delegated by the federal government, the
federal court and the tribal court derive their power from the same
6. The Reply Brief for the Petitioner on Petition for Writ of Certiorari notes that
although only two circuits have addressed the question that those two circuits
contain more than 80% of the recognized tribes in the United States. Reply Brief
for Petitioner, United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2003/2pet/7pet/2003-0107.pet.rep.html (citing
"information provided to this Office by the Bureau of Indian Affairs" which states
that "of the 562 recognized Tribes in the United States (see 67 Fed. Reg. 46,328
(2992)), 455 are located in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits).
7. United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 982 (2003). The petition for cert frames the
issue as: "Whether Section 1301, as amended, validly restores the Tribes' sover-
eign power to prosecute members of other Tribes (rather than delegates federal
prosecutorial power to the Tribes), such that a federal prosecution following a
tribal prosecution for an offense with the same elements is valid under the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Pet. for Cert. at I, United
States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 982 (2003), available at 2003 WL 22428587 (Appellate
Filing) Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (Jul. 22, 2003).
8. Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or not so Little) Constitutional Crisis De-
veloping in Indian Law? A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271 (2003).
9. "This case sits at the intersection oftwo complicated bodies of law: the dual sover-
eignty exception to double jeopardy, and the sovereign power of Indian tribes."
Enas, 255 F.3d at 664. The issue also raises separation of powers questions.
10. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall "be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
11. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 321 (1978). See infra Section B.1. (dis-
cussing double jeopardy and the dual sovereignty doctrine).
12. Enas, 255 F.3d at 664-65.
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source, and Double Jeopardy bars successive prosecution by the two
courts.
Deciding the source of tribal court criminal jurisdiction in a given
situation is a complicated task, however, because tribal jurisdiction is
not one-dimensional. Instead, a tribe's jurisdiction over a crime com-
mitted on the reservation often depends upon the nature of the crime,
the identity of the parties, and treaties and statutes specifically ceding
jurisdiction over certain matters or peoples to other sovereigns. The
complexity of tribal jurisdiction derives, in part, from the
demographics of the reservation. Three categories of residents make
their home in Indian Country: (1) members of the tribe, (2) non-Indi-
ans, and (3) Indians who are not enrolled members of the tribe on
whose reservation they reside, who are considered nonmember Indi-
ans.13 Rules governing jurisdiction can differ for each category. The
way courts have used these labels and practical questions raised by
wide demographic variety in Indian Country play an important role in
deciding tribal jurisdictional questions. The Court must consider this
variety when analyzing double jeopardy issues in Indian Country.14
13. This group would include Indians enrolled in other tribes, and Indians who are
not enrolled at all. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
14. Demographic categories also raise questions of equal protection. This Article will
follow the lead of the circuit courts, and will not address equal protection issues.
Moreover, other authors have studied and analyzed the equal protection issues in
depth. Many find that equal protection concerns should not interfere with tribal
sovereignty. See, e.g., David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection
Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 759 (1991). Williams concludes that
Indians are different and that they are a separate people with a right to develop
in their own way, and that the authors of the Fifth and Fourteen Amendments
did not intend Indians to fall within their purview. Id. at 835. Nell Jessup
Newton argues tribes should be able to make the same distinctions in their crimi-
nal scheme as the federal government has made in its scheme. Further, she
notes wryly that it is the decision of the Supreme Court in limiting criminal juris-
diction that has eliminated the opportunity for tribes to treat defendants the
same regardless of race Nell Jessup Newton, CommentaryPermanent Legislation
to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 Am. INDAN L. REV. 109, 119-124 (1992). Alex
Tallchief Skibine maintains that the classification of Indians is "at least partially
based on race" and strict scrutiny applies "unless Congress' action can be tied
rationally to the fulfillment of its unique obligation toward Indians." Alex
Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation that Overturned it: A Power
Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767, 784-791 (1993). Rob-
ert N. Clinton argues that individual Indians derive their identities from the
tribe, and to limit tribal sovereignty discriminates against Indians on the basis of
race. Robert H. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal
Protection ofIndian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 1053
(1981). Others find equal protection concerns will eventually bar everything ex-
cept member jurisdiction, or will subject tribes to strict scrutiny when actions
involve nonmembers. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special
Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L. J. 537, 611 (1996); L.
Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 843-44 (1996). Gould also suggests tribes address equal pro-
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Double jeopardy analysis is further complicated by the lack of clar-
ity concerning whether tribal courts have jurisdiction over nonmem-
ber Indians at all. In Duro v. Reina,15 the United States Supreme
Court held that tribal courts cannot exert criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians. Six months later, Congress responded in what
has become known as "the Duro override" or "the Duro fix." Congress
amended the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) to "recognize" the "inher-
ent" power of the tribes.16 The Duro override raises what scholars
Philip S. Deloria and Nell Jessup Newton have called "complex and
subtle issues of constitutional law." 17 Separation of powers questions
remain concerning which law will govern: Duro, or the Duro override?
If the Supreme Court decided Duro on a constitutional basis, then
Congress may not have the authority to override Duro, and the Duro
decision stands.' 8 But if Duro was decided as a matter of federal com-
mon law, without a constitutional basis, then Congress can overrule
the Court. 19 Thus, to decide the source of tribal jurisdiction, which
will decide the double jeopardy question, one must carefully analyze
Duro v. Reina.
Two opinions served as the primary building blocks for the Duro
rationale: United States v. Wheeler2O and Oliphant v. Suquamish In-
dian Tribe.21 These cases, decided within the same year, presented
different outcomes on questions of Indian sovereignty. Wheeler held
that the dual sovereignty exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause al-
lowed successive tribal/federal prosecutions for tribal members be-
cause tribal sovereignty over members was inherent and not
tection concerns by changing membership rules to include multi-racial members,
L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 702 (2001).
15. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
16. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(2) (2000).
17. Philip S. Deloria & Nell Jessup Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal
Courts Over Non-member Indians, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 70, 73 (1991).
18. The Court stated in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958), that "the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.... ." Schol-
ars continue to debate, however, whether Congress lacks authority to correct the
Court when the basis of the Court's decision is the Constitution. See, e.g., Larry
D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Forward: We the Court, 115 HARv. L.
REV. 4 (2001).
19. The Ninth Circuit analyzes the issue in this way. Enas, 255 F.3d at 673-74. Fed-
eral common law is generally accepted as "court-made law that is neither consti-
tutional or statutory." Id. at 674-75 (citing ERWIN CHERMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 349 (3 ed. 1999)). In National Farmers Union Insurance Companies
v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985), the Court held that Indian law
precedent, as federal common law, gave plaintiffs a basis for federal district court
jurisdiction after they had exhausted tribal court remedies.
20. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
21. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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delegated from the federal government. 22 In contrast, Oliphant held
that tribal courts could not exert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans because the tribes cannot exercise their sovereignty in ways that
"conflict with the interests of [the] overriding [federal] sovereignty."23
In Duro the Court attempted to reconcile the recognition of inherent
sovereignty over a tribal member in Wheeler, with the rejection of sov-
ereignty over non-Indians in Oliphant. In the process, traditional con-
cepts of geographically-based jurisdiction gave way to what
commentator L. Scott Gould calls the inception of a new paradigm of
Indian sovereignty, 24 one based only on membership, or consent juris-
diction. 2 5 Scholar Philip Frickey, on the other hand, has written that
the consent jurisdiction theory fails because it attempts "to impose an
artificial coherence upon the field."26 This new theory poses yet an-
other question that runs through the multi-layered analysis concern-
ing criminal jurisdiction, double jeopardy and nonmember Indians in
Indian Country. When the United States Supreme Court addresses
the issue, will it continue on the path of members-only jurisdiction for
the tribes or will it leave open the older paths of deference to Congress'
explicit intent in matters of tribal jurisdiction?
This Article attempts to answer this and other questions posed
here. The Article gathers and analyzes various strands of law that
contribute to the analysis of double jeopardy and nonmember Indians
in Indian Country and the choices the Court faces when it decides
double jeopardy issues. Part One briefly investigalis the
demographics of Indian Country, because the demographic diversity of
the tribes plays a part in understanding the difficulty the Court will
face when addressing this issue. Part Two reviews double jeopardy
doctrines and the Wheeler decision, the first decision to address how
the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to successive tribal/federal prose-
cutions. Part Three summarizes the complex rules governing criminal
22. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323-24.
23. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209.
24. "Confronted with this history, the Oliphant Court began the journey to consent-
based sovereignty." L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at
the Millenium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 845 (1996). "In reaching its decision, the
Wheeler Court described the central principle of the consent paradigm." Id. at
849.
25. "Consent based jurisdiction" as Scott Gould uses the term, means that the tribe
has jurisdiction only over members who have consented to jurisdiction by becom-
ing members. This kind ofjurisdiction contrasts with "territorial jurisdiction," or
jurisdiction over those who enter a sovereign's territory. See generally Gould,
supra note 25. This Article uses the term "consent based jurisdiction" and "mem-
bers-only jurisdiction" interchangeably.
26. Phillip P. Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation
in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1754, 1768 (1997). Frickey finds the
work "contains important insights," but that "[o]n its own terms, Gould's thesis is
riddled with exceptions that deprive it of the quality of coherent theoretical
framework for a field of inquiry." Id.
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jurisdiction in tribal courts and examines Oliphant, Duro, and the
Duro override. Part Four presents highlights from the split opinions,
setting out the reasoning of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Part Five
analyzes the choices that the Court will face if the issue comes before
them. Finally, the Article concludes by recommending that the Court
defer to Congress' power to determine the limits of tribal sovereignty,
and that both Congress and the Court defer to the duty of the tribe to
protect its members by allowing tribal prosecution of nonmembers.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Demographics in Indian Country
The Court's decision about criminal jurisdiction and double jeop-
ardy on the reservation will have lasting effects on law enforcement in
Indian Country. To make wise choices, decision makers must have a
realistic view of the demographic realities of life on the reservation.
What it means to be a tribe, the membership rules of individual tribes,
and the ratios of tribal members to nonmembers or non-Indians on a
given reservation are all tribal features that vary widely, making it
difficult to generalize. Nevertheless, it is clear that many reservations
are home to a mix of members, nonmembers, and non-Indians.
Duro, and the cases on which Duro relies, devote considerable dis-
cussion on the individual's ability to participate in government and
the individual rights of nonmembers and non-Indians.2 7 Discussion of
individual rights in most Indian law cases is rare because much of the
federal law concerning Native Americans deals with tribes, and not
individuals. 28 Traditionally, it was the tribes, not individuals, that
negotiated treaties with the United States; therefore, the benefits and
burdens derived from those treaties often accrued to the tribe and not
the individual tribal members. 29 As a result, tribal membership gen-
erally determined individual members' rights. If the Supreme Court
finds a constitutional basis for Duro, the resulting limit on tribal juris-
diction to tribal members would render membership rules even more
important than in the past. Over twenty years ago, Indian law scholar
Robert Clinton wrote about the problems that the inquiry into mem-
bership might create.
The Court's focus on political membership of tribal Indians has had another
awkward consequence-the fragmentation of governance on Indian reserva-
tions. Indian communities often include many individuals, sometimes full-
blooded Indians, who through marriage or as a result of having parents of
different tribal backgrounds, are ineligible for formal enrollment as members
of the tribe on whose reservation they reside. Yet Indians and non-Indians
alike usually consider such persons to be socially, economically, and culturally
27. Duro, 495 U.S. at 691-92.




part of the Indian community. The Court's blind and rigid focus on tribal affil-
iation is beginning to oust Indian tribes from power to govern these nonmem-
ber Indians and to enlarge the sphere of state authority over these Indian
residents who are not members of the governing tribe even if they are enrolled
members of a different tribe. This recent development [of focusing on mem-
bership] is inconsistent with prior law and is profoundly disturbing to the in-
tegrity of the reservation Indian community. 3 0
As Clinton notes, membership rules, the question of who is an "In-
dian," and who may enroll in a particular tribe, are complex and con-
text-dependent. 3 1 In some situations, individuals must be recognized
as an enrolled member of a federally recognized tribe to reap certain
legal benefits, while in others, ethnicity alone is sufficient. 32 In the
absence of federal legislation dictating otherwise, each tribe has the
authority to determine its own membership criteria. 3 3
The wide variance in membership rules results in many reserva-
tions becoming home to a significant population of nonmember Indi-
ans. 34 Some tribal constitutions automatically provide membership
for every child born to a member of the tribe, while others require ap-
plication, a certain blood quantum, residency, or that father, mother
or both parents be enrolled members.35 Some tribes recognize a loss
of membership if the member leaves the reservation.3 6 Some tribes
allow membership for Indians of other tribes who reside on the reser-
30. Clinton, supra note 15, at 1015-16.
31. "The number of different, often conflicting, definitions of "Indian" in federal law
has been estimated at over eighty." William J. Hapiuk, Note, Of Kitch and
Kachinas: A Critical Analysis of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 53 Stan.
L. Rev. 1009 n.14 (2001) (citing WARD CHURCHILL, THE CRUCIBLE OF AMERICAN
INDIAN IDENTITY: NATIVE TRADITION VERSUS COLONIAL IMPOSITION IN POSTCON-
QUEST NORTH AMERICA, in CONTEMPORARY NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL ISSUES
39, 54 (Duane Champagne ed., 1999)).
32. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 24 (1945). Some federal statutes
include multiple definitions of "Indian," which may not reference membership in
an Indian tribe at all.
33. Id. at 20; see also Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians v. Udall, 355
F.2d 364 (10th Cir. 1966) cert. denied 385 U.S. 831 (1966). Generally speaking,
the two most common requirements to claim Indian status are some measure of
Indian blood and recognition by the tribal community as Indian. Cohen, supra
note 33 at
34. Membership rules may exclude individuals that other laws may recognize as In-
dians. A typical example of membership rules thwarting enrollment of full
blooded Indians posits a child born to an Indian father whose tribe enrolls only
children of female members. The same child's mother is a member of a different
tribe who only enrolls children of male members. Thus, the child is 100% Indian,
but unable to enroll with either tribe.
35. Chriss Wetherington, Note, Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts Over Non-




vation, while others do not.3 7 Some Indians may choose not to enroll
for political or other reasons. 3S
Although we lack much important data, we do know that the demo-
graphic context varies from tribe to tribe. 39 The array of federal and
tribal rules that make defining tribes and Indians such a complex
task, combined with federal policies that have encouraged a diverse
population on reservations, are likely causes of these wide demo-
graphic variations.
Not only are membership rules complex, but the task of defining
what constitutes a tribe under federal law is not always simple. 40
Moreover, federal government policies have sometimes grouped mem-
bers of more than one tribe together, ignoring age-old ethnological di-
visions, to create "consolidated" or "confederated" tribes.41 These
artificial groupings create populations that include a diverse group of
Indians and, along with other federal policies, have resulted in a res-
ervation population that is far from homogenous. Foremost among
those federal policies resulting in a mixed reservation population is
the Allotment Act, a program that privatized tribal land in an effort to
assimilate Indians.4 2 The Allotment Act has long been best recog-
nized for its devastation of many tribes because those tribes lost much
of their land during the Allotment Period. 43 Allotment, as an assimi-
37. Id.
38. Deloria and Newton, supra note 18, at 73. Newton writes that Indians may
choose not to enroll as an act of protest against the Indian Reorganization Act, or
for other causes.
39. Gould, supra note 25, at 829-30.
40. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw 3-4 (3d ed. 1998) (Stating: "[There]
is no all-purpose definition of an Indian tribe. A group of Indians may qualify as
a tribe for the purpose of one statute or federal program, but fail to qualify for
others.").
41. Id. at 5; Clinton, supra note 15, at 987-88; see also Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 192
(explaining that "[two hundred years ago, the area bordering Puget Sound con-
sisted of a large number of politically autonomous Indian villages... [that] were
aggregated into a series of Indian tribes . . . ."). Robert Clinton writes, "The
United States negotiators forced tribes, which were organized on a basis of group
consent to select 'chiefs' or leaders who could speak for the tribe in dealings with
the Americans. At other times the negotiators simply acted as if there were a
tribal leader who could speak for the tribe, when in fact there was not." Robert N.
Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian
Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 987-88 (1981). Other ex-
amples of confederated tribes include the Confederated Tribes and Bands of
Yakima Indians, or the Confederated Tribe of the Colville Indians.
42. The General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (2000) was also known as the
Dawes Act. Under the Allotment Act, the United States took title of reservation
lands away from the tribes and gave it to individual Indians in an effort to instill
in Indians the dominant culture's belief in the value of private property.
43. Implementation of the Act diminished tribal land holdings dramatically; tribes
lost a total of nearly 90 million acres or eighty percent of tribal holdings. Steven
20041
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lationist policy, was ultimately a failure,4 4 but during that period a
great deal of tribal land was transferred to non-Indians. When land
passed out of the hands of tribal members and into the hands of non-
Indians or nonmember Indians, the reservations became "check-
erboards" of tribal and non-tribal land. Similarly, educational poli-
cies, adoption policies, and the establishment of Bureau of Indian
Affairs employment preferences have resulted in many individuals liv-
ing on reservations where they are not members. 4 5 Under these fed-
eral policies, reservation populations have come to include non-
Indians, members of the tribe, Indians who are members of another
tribe, and Indians who are not enrolled members of any tribe.46
Finally, the population mix of members, nonmember Indians and
non-Indians can vary enormously from one reservation to another,
making it hard for general rules to apply equally well in diverse situa-
tions. On some reservations, like the Suquamish Reservation in-
volved in Oliphant, non-Indians far outnumber members and
nonmember Indians.4 7 The opposite is true, however, for the majority
of tribes. Scott Gould writes that "[almong the 124 tribal courts oper-
ating in 1990, ninety-three were in fact located on reservations in
which Indians comprised the majority of reservation population.
Moreover, among these, forty-five courts were located on reservations
in which Indians comprised 90% or more of the total population."48
Those figures, however, leave thirty-one tribal courts operating on res-
ervations where Indians are not the majority.
Scott McSloy, Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st Cen-
tury, 20 N.Y.U. REV. OF LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE 217, 247-48 (1993).
44. ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 332 (1970). Debo
notes that after the states had succeeded in taking nearly everything they could
want from the tribes, "it began to dawn on some of the good people who had urged
the allotment policy that perhaps the Indians were not exactly prospering under
it." Id.
45. Wetherington, supra note 36 at 1058-59. Wetherington cites the Vocational
Training Program, 25 U.S.C. § 309 (2002), the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25
U.S.C. § 1901 (2002) and employment practices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) as contributing to Indians leaving their own reservations to move to either
"urban areas which became 'melting pots' for Indians of different tribal ancestry,"
or to move to other reservations. Id. at 1059. Indian children were removed from
the reservation for educational programs. The Indian Child Welfare Act some-
times places a child from one tribe with a family on the reservation of another. 25
U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3) (2000). BIA employment preferences for Indians sometimes
mean that the best available job for an Indian is working on a reservation of
another tribe. Id. at 1059.
46. Deloria and Newton, supra note 18, at 71 (Newton claims significant numbers of
all three categories.)
47. In Oliphant, the Court notes that approximately 50 members of the Suquamish
Tribe reside on the reservation, while 2,928 non-Indians live there. Oliphant,
435 U.S. at 193 n.1.
48. L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising Sov-
ereignty and the Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53, 127 (1994).
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Beyond general knowledge, however, currently no comprehensive
studies provide definitive demographic data on the populations in In-
dian Country.49 Some authors have addressed the lack of data by us-
ing information from the United States Census, but the time between
census data collection and publication is problematic, and data collec-
tion on the reservation may not be complete. 50 Thus, while the ques-
tion of defining tribal membership is central to the resolution of many
issues, including the double jeopardy question addressed here, any
analysis must acknowledge the limitations inherent in the lack of co-
herent and complete data on tribal membership.
B. Double Jeopardy and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine in
Indian Country
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution provides that citizens will not "be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."51 The notion
that the individual should be spared the anxiety of defending against
the might of the state more than once for the same offense has been
called "the oldest of all the Bill of Rights guarantees," having its ori-
gins in many cultures.5 2 The policies that Double Jeopardy furthers
include relieving citizens from the anxiety and expense of successive
prosecutions and the fundamental unfairness that would result from
the increased likelihood of prosecutorial success in multiple trials.
The Court addressed many of the core issues concerning double
jeopardy in Indian Country when it decided United States v. Wheeler
by applying the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine. The Dual Sovereignty
Doctrine, complex and the object of much criticism, was integral to the
Wheeler holding. This Article turns now to that doctrine and the
Wheeler decision.
1. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
Although the Court had addressed the issue of serial prosecution
in dicta earlier,53 the primary exception to the Double Jeopardy
49. Deloria and Newton, supra note 18 at 75.
50. Gould, supra note 49, at n.346.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. V
52. George C. Thomas, III, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REV. 827, 828-36; see also Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal Govern-
ments: Another Exercise in Federalism, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1538 (1967) (citing 4
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 337-38 for its discussion of double jeopardy).
53. Early in the nineteenth century the Court noted its disapproval of successive
prosecution in two cases. United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184
(1820); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). Later, the Court re-
sponded to arguments that the power to criminalize conduct was the province of
the states and the federal government could not constitutionally legislate in those
areas. Michael A. Dawson, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual
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Clause, the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, was first applied in 1922 in
United States v. Lanza.5 4 The Court based the doctrine on the com-
mon law notion that a criminal offense is more than a crime against
certain individuals; it is a crime against the sovereignty of the govern-
ment. 55 The Court adopted the rationale elaborated in Moore v. Iii-
nois,5 6 in language often quoted in later opinions, including Wheeler,5 7
and by scholars:
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory. He
may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punish-
ment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offence or
transgression of the laws of both .... Yet it cannot be truly averred that the
offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one
act he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly
punishable."5
8
The doctrine applies not only to state-federal successive prosecutions,
but also to state-state successive prosecutions.59
The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine is not without limits; it does not
apply when prosecution by the second sovereign is merely a sham or a
tool to allow a second attempt at prosecution.6 0 Further, when both
jurisdictions derive power from the same source, such as a state and a
subdivision of the state, they are not separate sovereigns, and the doc-
trine does not apply.6 1 Thus, cities are not separate sovereigns from
Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281, 290 (1992). Thus, the Court changed
direction in Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847), in Fox v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 13 (1852), and expressed the view that dual prosecutions by separate sov-
ereigns would not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
54. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
55. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985).
56. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
57. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 317 (1978) (citing Moore, 55 U.S. (14
How.) at 19-20 (1852)).
58. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 317-18; see also Heath, 474 U.S. at 88; Abbate v. United
States, 359 U.S. 187, 192 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1959);
Akhil Reed Amar and Jonathan Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney
King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1995).
59. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985). In Heath, the Court allowed Alabama to
try the defendant and impose the death penalty after Georgia had successfully
convicted him and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
60. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 123-24. Although the majority in Bartkus found no
sham prosecution, Justice Brennan dissented, saying
What happened here was simply that the federal effort which failed in
the federal courthouse was renewed a second time in the state court-
house across the street. Not content with the federal jury's resolution of
conflicting testimony in Bartkus' favor, the federal officers engineered
this second prosecution and on the second try obtained the desired con-
viction. It is exactly this kind of successive prosecution by federal officers
that the Fifth Amendment was intended to prohibit.
Id. at 169 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 395 (1970).
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states,62 and United States territories are not separate sovereigns
from the federal government. 6 3
Also, certain federal agency policies and parallel state provisions
provide further limits on the doctrine. The Petite Policy is a Depart-
ment of Justice policy that forbids federal prosecution if the alleged
criminality was an ingredient of a previous state prosecution, unless
the prosecution will serve "compelling interests of federal law enforce-
ment."64 Commentators disagree on how often the Petite Policy bars
successive state-federal prosecution. 6 5 Regardless of whether federal
prosecutors use the doctrine rarely or routinely, however, the Petite
Policy leaves the determination whether federal interests are compel-
ling to the discretion of federal prosecutors. Moreover, several states
have limited the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine by adopting either consti-
tutional or legislative prohibitions on its applicability to state prosecu-
tions.6 6 The effectiveness of these prohibitions has also been
questioned.67
Proponents of the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine in the context of
state-federal successive prosecutions or state-state successive prosecu-
tions have praised it primarily for its practical effects on law enforce-
ment.68 Use of the doctrine has the further positive effects of avoiding
a "race to the courthouse" that could result in hasty, mistaken prose-
cutions 6 9 and minimizing the impact of "imperfect coordination" be-
62. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964).
63. Domenech v. Natl City Bank of N.Y., 294 U.S. 199, 204-05 (1935).
64. Thompson v. United States, 444 U.S. 248, 248 (1980); see also Petite v. United
States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960); Dawson, supra note 54, at n.86 (citing UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL 9-2.142 (1980)).
65. "Successive prosecutions, however, are not the norm." Robert Matz, Dual Sover-
eignty and the Double Jeopardy Clause: If at First You Don't Convict, Try, Try
Again, 24 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 353, 362 (1997) (citing United States v. Davis, 906
F.2d 829, 833 (2d Cir. 1990). "Furthermore, while the policy limits the instances
of federal prosecutions following state prosecutions, such prosecutions are
brought routinely." Dawson, supra note 54, at 294. See, e.g., United States v.
Simpkins, 953 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014 (7th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Aboumoussallem,
726 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1984)).
66. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire holds that the state constitution's double
jeopardy provision allows no exception for separate sovereigns. See, e.g., State v.
Hogg, 385 A.2d 844, 847 ( N.H. 1978) (holding that the state constitution's double
jeopardy provision allows no exception for separate sovereigns). States have lim-
ited the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine to varying degrees. See Dawson, supra note
54 at nn. 94-97.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959) (upholding successive
state and federal prosecutions as consistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause).
69. Evan Tsen Lee, The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: In the Wake




tween state and federal prosecutors. 70 Many are critical of the
doctrine, however. Some scholars have questioned its constitutional-
ity,71 and others have found no basis for the doctrine in the common
law.72 Other observers have suggested that the policies supporting
the doctrine are less compelling because the doctrine was decided
before there was much federal criminal law, and before technology al-
lowed greater cooperation between federal and state law enforcement
agencies. 73 Further, critics have found the foundational theory of the
doctrine defective, arguing sovereignty in our system resides in the
people, and not in either the state or the federal government. 74
Though "[clommentators have virtually uniformly argued against
the dual sovereignty theory the Court has forged, advocating its aboli-
tion, or at least limitation,"75 the Court has shown no sign of aban-
doning the doctrine. The Court clearly delineated and reaffirmed its
use in Wheeler, the case that first examined double jeopardy issues in
Indian Country. In Wheeler, the Court was called upon to decide
whether the Dual Sovereignty doctrine applied to tribes: sovereigns
who have been defined as "domestic dependent nations."76
2. United States v. Wheeler
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
double jeopardy in Indian Country in 1978 in United States v.
Wheeler.77 Without distinguishing between member and non-member
Indians, the Court framed the issue in Wheeler as "whether the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars the prosecution
of an Indian in a federal district court under the Major Crimes Act,...
when he has previously been convicted in a tribal court of a lesser
included offense arising out of the same incident." 78 The Court's use
of the more general term "Indian," and not "member" to frame the
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Amar and Marcus, supra note 59 at 4-5; Dawson, supra note 54 at 299-
302; Walter T. Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding
Constitution, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1961);.
72. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1429-30
(1987); Fisher, supra note 72; J.A.C. Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and
Nation: Common Law and British Empire Comparisons, 4 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 1-2
(1956).
73. Matz, supra note 66, at 367.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty,
Rodney King, and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. REV. 609, 618 (1993).
76. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-17 (1831). Part of the "Mar-
shall Trilogy," Cherokee Nation established that the tribes were not foreign sover-
eigns, but rather "domestic dependent nations," and that the federal-tribe
relationship was that of guardian and ward.
77. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
78. Id. at 314.
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question does not settle the question for all Indians, however, because
the defendant in Wheeler was a member of the Navajo tribe who was
convicted in Navajo tribal court of disorderly conduct and contributing
to the delinquency of a minor. 79 Thus, Wheeler leaves open the issue
of double jeopardy as it pertains to nonmembers Indians.
In Wheeler, over a year after the tribal convictions, a federal grand
jury returned an indictment against the same Navajo member. The
charge was statutory rape, and it was based on the same facts the
Navajo court had decided a year earlier.8 0 The respondent moved to
dismiss the indictment based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. Fur-
ther, the respondent argued that the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine did
not apply to the Navajo because the tribe was subject to the plenary
power of Congress and thus was not a separate sovereign.8 1 The
Court, however, ruled that the Navajo tribe's inherent sovereignty,
which included the power to punish tribal offenders, had not been lost
by treaty, statute, or its status as a "domestic dependent nation."8 2
Thus, the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine applied, and the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause did not preclude the federal prosecution following a trial
arising out of the same facts in tribal court.
In Wheeler, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, outlined the
limits of the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, noting that territories of the
United States are not separate sovereigns,8 3 nor are a state and a mu-
nicipality within that state separate sovereigns.8 4 The Court ex-
plained the doctrine's applicability by stating that it is not the degree
of control that one sovereign exercised over another, "but rather the
ultimate source of the power under which the respective prosecutions
were undertaken."85
The opinion elaborates on the nature of the relationship between
states and the national government as a relationship of independent
"political communities," with each community "'[e]xercising its own
sovereignty, not that of the other[,]'" despite the fact that the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution gives the federal
government the power to enact laws that supersede the laws of any
individual state.8 6 Thus, rejecting "control" as the touchstone for sep-
arate sovereigns, the Court also rejects the argument that the ulti-
79. Id. at 315-16
80. Id.
81. Id. at 319.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 318 (citing Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907)).
84. Id. (citing Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970)).
85. Id. at 319-20.
86. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 320 (citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 379-82
(1922) which held that the state's power to legislate concerning prohibition was
part of its inherent sovereignty, and was not derived from the Eighteenth
Amendment's grant of concurrent jurisdiction to Congress).
2004] 903
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
mate control, plenary power, that Congress exercises over the
tribes,8 7 prevents tribes from exercising a sovereignty that is separate
from the federal government.8 8
The Wheeler opinion contains language about the tribes' sover-
eignty that would, at first glance, give much hope to those who sup-
port sovereignty for the tribes. The Court cited Felix Cohen's
Handbook of Federal Indian Law for the proposition that tribal pow-
ers are "'inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been
extinguished.'-8 9 The Court asserted that "[o]ur cases recognize that
the Indian tribes have not given up their full sovereignty[,]" and "[are]
a good deal more than 'private, voluntary organizations."' 9o "In sum,
Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn
by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their
dependent status."91
Despite the Court's recognition of the tribe's inherent sovereignty,
there is much in Wheeler that can be seen as suggesting limits to tri-
bal authority. The Court distinguished between tribal sovereignty
over internal relations and tribal sovereignty over external rela-
tions.9 2 For example, the Court states, "'[i]mplicit in these treaty
terms... was the understanding that the internal affairs of the Indi-
ans remained exclusively within the jurisdiction of whatever tribal
government existed.'" 9 3 The Court implies by this that "external"
matters involving the tribes would be left to the federal government.
Further, the opinion contains language which would severely limit
the tribe's sovereignty, when read literally, as it later would be in
Duro v. Reina.94 The Wheeler Court opened itself up to such limita-
tions when it stated, for example, that "areas in which such implicit
87. A long line of cases have recognized the plenary power of Congress. See, e.g.,
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886). The doctrine is usually regarded as outside the text of
the Constitution; the Court rejected the argument that the Major Crimes act reg-
ulated "commerce" with the tribe under the Indian Commerce clause. Id. at 378-
79. Later, the Eighth Circuit found that the Court more often bases the power in
the Indian Commerce Clause.
88. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 321.
89. Id. at 322 (citing F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 122 (1942)).
90. Id. at 323 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
91. Id.
92. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 324.
93. Id. (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-222 (1959)). It is interesting that
the quote the Court chose from Williams uses the term "Indian" and not
"member."
94. In Duro v. Reina, the Court quoted Wheeler's statement that "[tribes] cannot try
nonmembers in tribal courts," 495 U.S. at 685 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326),
and remarked that "literal application of that statement to these facts would
bring this case to an end." Id. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, chides the major-




divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those
involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of
the tribe."95 And the problems with the Court's imprecision in
Wheeler do not end here.
Although the Court frequently refers to jurisdiction over "mem-
bers," it often uses the general term "Indian" and does not distinguish
between "Indian" and "member."96 One commentator analyzed the
Court's use of the two terms in Wheeler, and concluded:
Nothing about the facts in Wheeler indicates that the Court gave attention to
the distinction between members and nonmember Indians with significant
contacts to the reservation. Just as easily, one can conclude that by "nonmem-
ber" the Court meant "non-Indian," or alternatively nonmember Indian with-
out significant contacts with the reservation. Evidence of the continuing
ambiguity is also found in the Court's plainly imprecise use of the terms "non-
member" and "non-Indian" in subsequent opinions.9 7
Unless one recognizes the Court's indiscriminate and interchangeable
use of the terms "Indians" and "members," and "non-Indian" and "non-
member," the language in Wheeler would be daunting to anyone con-
structing an argument for tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.
In examining whether the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes suc-
cessive prosecution of nonmember Indians in tribal and federal fo-
rums, one more aspect of Wheeler requires comment. After addressing
the purely legal question of sovereignty, the Wheeler Court focused on
the practical reasons for holding that the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
applied. 98 The Court observed that the same policies that supported
use of the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine in other cases, such as Abbate
where the Court praised the pragmatic benefits of the doctrine regard-
ing law enforcement, supported its application in Indian Country. 99
Further, the strict limitations on punishment in tribal courts could
serve to entice offenders to appear first in tribal court to bar federal
prosecution and its more serious penaltiesloo Although the Wheeler
95. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.
96. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the court should give "little weight" to use of the
terms "members" and "nonmembers" in Wheeler because the use was "indiscrimi-
nate." Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (1988); see also Wetherington,
supra note 36 at 1076-77.
97. Wetherington, supra note 36, at 1077. In this excellent student note, Wether-
ington goes on to analyze the indiscriminate use of the term "non-Indian" and
"non-member" in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reser-
vation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130
(1982). Id. at 1078.
98. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 330. The Court devotes the last section of the opinion to
practical concerns.
99. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 330-32 ("Moreover, the same sort of 'undesirable conse-
quences' identified in Abbate could occur if successive tribal and federal prosecu-
tions were barred despite the fact that tribal and federal courts are arms of
separate sovereigns.").
100. Id. at 330-331.
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Court suggested that Congress could solve that problem by depriving
tribes of criminal jurisdiction altogether, the Court concluded that the
tribal courts are "important mechanisms for protecting significant tri-
bal interests" and that they filled the important role of protecting cus-
toms and traditions that "can differ greatly from our own."1 0
Thus, Wheeler is a pragmatic decision that firmly recognizes the
inherent power of the tribe in matters of criminal jurisdiction over
members of the tribe. Only six months prior to Wheeler, the Court had
decided a landmark case concerning tribal court criminal jurisdiction,
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 10 2 which held that the tribes
had no jurisdiction over non-Indians residents on reservations.103
Understanding the history of criminal jurisdiction that led up to the
Oliphant decision is critical to understanding the choices the Court
will face in resolving the question of double jeopardy and nonmember
Indians in Indian Country.
C. Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
The rules governing criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country have
been called a "conflicting morass,"104 and a "convoluted knot,"105 caus-
ing one scholar to wonder "whether there is anything more substantial
than a judicial gut instinct at work in these cases."' 06 Some have
noted parallel and conflicting decisions from the Supreme Court on
questions of tribal jurisdiction over criminal conduct.10 7 Changing
times have contributed to the muddle, as evidenced by the pendulum
swing from policies of assimilation to recognition of tribal sover-
eignty,' 0 8 decisionmakers' failure to honor treaties,109 and many
years of decision-makers failing to distinguish between members and
nonmembers generally, or between members and nonmember Indians
of a particular tribe, but distinguishing instead between Indians and
non-Indians.110
101. Id. at 331. Indeed, the Court observed that these policy interests of protecting
the role of tribal courts may be just as "undesirable as the federal pre-emption of
state criminal jurisdiction that would have avoided conflict in Bartkus and Ab-
bate." Id.
102. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
103. Id. at 195.
104. Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: The
Historical Perspective, 17 Amz. L. REV. 951, 951 (1975).
105. Gould, supra note 49, at 61.
106. Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999).
107. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 105, at 985-88.
108. See generally CHARLES F. WILKERSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW
(1987).
109. See Clinton, supra note 105, at 972. Clinton sets out a section he calls "Conflict of
Statute and Treaty: The Rationalization for Broken Treaties."
110. See Wetherington, supra note 36 at 1075-1079.
[Vol. 82:889
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
1. Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
Historically, tribes had jurisdiction over anyone within their bor-
ders."' But soon after nationhood, Congressional consideration of tri-
bal jurisdiction began to distinguish situations involving non-Indians
from those involving exclusively Indians. In the late 1700's, Congress
provided federal courts with jurisdiction over non-Indians who com-
mitted crimes against Indians, even in geographic areas under tribal
control.112 By 1817, the General Crimes Act,113 one of the three most
important federal statutes governing criminal jurisdiction in Indian
Country,114 extended federal jurisdiction to crimes committed in In-
dian Country against non-Indians. The only exception to federal juris-
diction was for crimes committed by Indians against Indians, which
Congress left to the jurisdiction of tribes, regardless of
membership.115
The Supreme Court expressed its faith in tribal jurisdiction over
Indians in Ex parte Crow Dog, 116 holding that the General Crimes Act
did not extend to any Indian-on-Indian crimes. 1 17 Congress re-
sponded to Crow Dog by passing the Major Crimes Act, mandating
federal jurisdiction over serious crimes, without regard to whether vic-
tims were Indian or non-Indian.11s The Major Crimes Act, another of
the principal federal statutes governing tribal jurisdiction, originally
limited federal court jurisdiction to seven crimes,119 but Congress has
expanded the Act to include seven more offenses, 120 conferring federal
111. See Canby, supra note 41, at 123-24.
112. See id. at 124 (citing 1 Stat. 138 (1790)). From 1776 to 1871, the Senate exercised
primary power over relations with the tribes through the treaty power; but in
1871 the House of Representatives used their power to appropriate funds to pro-
vide in the Indian Appropriations Act that tribes were no longer to be regarded as
independent nations capable of negotiating treaties with the United States. Clin-
ton, supra note 105, at 957-58.
113. The General Crimes Act, also known as the Indian Crimes Act or the Federal
Enclaves Act, is now codified under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Currently, although the
General Crimes Act provides for prosecution of crimes where either the perpetra-
tor or the victim is non-Indian, the Act primarily fills the need for a way to punish
non-Indians in Indian Country. The Act contains a provision that has the effect
of making most of state criminal law applicable to areas under federal jurisdic-
tion. Further, the Act expressly excludes federal jurisdiction if a tribal court has
first heard the case. CANBY, supra note 41, at 124, 147-58.
114. "Indian Country" is a term of art. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2001).
115. CANBY, supra note 41, at 124 (citing 3 Stat. 383 (1817)).
116. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
117. Id.
118. Clinton, supra note 105, at 963-64 (citing 23 Stat. 385 (1885)).
119. Id. at 963. Originally, the Major Crimes Act conferred jurisdiction over murder,
manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny. Act.
of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385.
120. Currently, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000) provides that:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another
Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely murder,
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jurisdiction over a total of fourteen serious felonies. In 1948, Congress
supplemented the Major Crimes Act with a provision that ensures
that Indians in federal court receive all the procedural protections ac-
corded other defendants.121
States also play a part in the criminal jurisdiction puzzle, despite
the "foundational" early decisions of the United States Supreme Court
known as the Marshall Trilogy,12 2 which effectively removed states
from considerations of tribal sovereignty and federal exclusivity.123
States began to exercise jurisdiction in Indian Country in 1881 when
the United States Supreme Court held that states have exclusive ju-
risdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians against non-Indians
in Indian Country.12 4 Then, in 1953, during a period when assimila-
tion policies held ascendency,125 Congress responded to fears that law
manslaughter, kidnaping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest,
assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon,
assault resulting in serious bodily injury, an assault against an individ-
ual who has not attained the age of 16 years, arson, burglary, robbery,
and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country,
shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons com-
mitting any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not
defined and punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive juris-
diction of the United States shall be defined and punished in accordance
with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed as are in
force at the time of such offense.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 3242 (2000) provides that an Indian "shall be tried in the same courts
and in the same manner as are all other persons committing such offense within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." Further, Federal Sentencing
Guidelines apply. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2000). Note this is not a provision that
governs procedural protections in tribal court, but rather in federal courts.
122. The Marshall Trilogy, all written by Chief Justice John Marshall, includes John-
son v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding that under the doctrine of
discovery, tribes could not transfer title to land), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (holding that the tribes' status is that of "domestic depen-
dent nations" and not foreign nations), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 562-63 (1832) (holding that the state of Georgia could not prosecute Worces-
ter for preaching without a license in Indian Country).
123. Frank Pommersheim writes that:
The essential teachings that derive from the Marshall trilogy and form
the foundational basis of Indian law are the recognition of tribal sover-
eignty and self-government, federal exclusivity in dealing with Indian
tribes as a basic tenet of an emerging federalism, a unique federal-tribal
relationship often identified as the trust relationship, and, as a neces-
sary corollary, the absence of any inherent state authority in Indian
affairs.
Pommersheim, supra note 9, at 276.
124. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
125. See generally Charles F. Wilkinson and Eric R. Briggs, The Evolution of the Ter-
mination Policy, 5 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 139 (1977).
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enforcement was lax in Indian Country by passing Public Law 280,126
which returned states to the jurisdictional puzzle involving Indian de-
fendants and victims.
Public Law 280, noteworthy because the Supreme Court later of-
fered it as a solution to a jurisdictional void created in Duro, conferred
both criminal and civil jurisdiction in Indian Country on six states. 1 27
It explicitly stated that the General Crimes Act and the Major Crimes
Act no longer applied in those original six states. 128 In addition to the
six mandatory states, the statute gave other states the opportunity to
assume complete jurisdiction or partial jurisdiction if they chose to do
so. 12 9 Nine states have opted into jurisdiction.13o Later, as the as-
similationist policies of the termination era gave way to the self-deter-
mination policies of the 1960's, Congress amended Public Law 280 in
1968 to require that states secure the consent of the tribe before as-
suming jurisdiction.13 1 Only one tribe has consented to a state assum-
ing jurisdiction, and then only after the state agreed that it would
return jurisdiction to the tribe if the majority of the tribe voted in
favor of retrocession. 132
To summarize, jurisdiction in Indian Country varies according to
the nature of the crime, those involved in the crime, and whether the
state where the tribe is located falls within special jurisdictional pro-
visions of the United States Code. States have jurisdiction over
crimes committed in Indian Country involving non-Indian parties
and, in some cases, have express statutory authority to exert general
criminal jurisdiction. Absent such statutory grants to states, federal
jurisdiction is exclusive over crimes committed by non-Indians against
Indians, concurrent with the tribe if the defendant is Indian and the
victim is non-Indian and for certain serious crimes regardless of the
126. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (2000)). Carole E. Goldberg has described the conditions that led to Public
Law 280. Carole Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over
Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 535, 540-42 (1975).
127. § 2, 67 Stat. At 588-89. The six states expressly authorized in the statute were
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Alaska, which was ad-
ded in 1958.
128. Id. at 589.
129. Id. at § 7, 590.
130. The nine states that have assumed some authority under Public Law 280 include
Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, and
Washington. CANBY, supra note 41, at 234-35. "In some cases, the assuming
state required consent of the tribes, but Public Law 280 did not require it." Id. at
235.
131. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 401-402, 82 Stat. 78, 78-79 (current
version at 25 U.S.C. § § 1321-1322 (2000). Consent is determined by a majority
vote of adult members of the tribe. Id. at § 406, 80 (current version at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1326 (2000)). States may reverse the decision to assume jurisdiction under id.
at 403, 79 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (2000)).
132. CANBY, supra note 41, at 238 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 63-36-15).
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identity of defendant or victim. In cases of Indian on Indian offenses,
the tribes are left with the power of concurrent jurisdiction under the
General Crimes Act. The tribe may exert jurisdiction over offenses in
the Major Crimes Act, but rarely do so because the Indian Civil Rights
Act limits tribes to imposing sentences not to exceed one year impris-
onment and a $5000 fine or both.133
2. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribes
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribes,13 4 a landmark case in
which the Supreme Court narrowed tribal criminal jurisdiction in
cases involving non-Indians, presented themes that reappear in the
question of double jeopardy and nonmember Indians. Thus, a solid
understanding of the Oliphant Court's reasoning is necessary to un-
derstand later analysis of nonmember double jeopardy. The Court im-
plicitly acknowledged that the demographic results of the Allotment
Act 135 played a role in the decision, by taking pains to state that at
the time of the decision the Suquamish made up less than 2 percent of
the population of the residents on the Port Madison reservation. 13 6
Oliphant, a non-Indian resident of the reservation, was charged with
assaulting a tribal officer and resisting arrest. He argued that the
tribal court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Both the federal dis-
trict court and the Ninth Circuit held that the case was properly
before the tribal court.13 7 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
reversed.13 8
In Oliphant, the Court relied on a historical approach, rather than
relying on precedent or a legislative enactment. The opinion began
with a long discussion of the history of tribal court jurisdiction over
non-Indians, and apparently relied in large part on this historical re-
view to support its conclusion. 139 Although the Court used this his-
tory to justify its decision, at least two scholars have questioned the
accuracy of this historical review. 140 The Oliphant Court rarely cited
Supreme Court precedent or federal statutory law, but made asser-
133. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2000).
134. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
135. See discussion on demographics infra Section II.A. Professor Scott Gould credits
Congressional policy of allotments as the reason for the Oliphant decision.
Gould, supra note 15, at 844.
136. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212. In 1978, at the time the Court heard the case, the
tribe held 63% of the reservation land in fee simple, but out of approximately
2978 residents, only about 50 were members of the tribe. Gould, supra note 15,
at 844 n.1.
137. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976).
138. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194-95.
139. Id. at 195-206.
140. See generally Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Be-
trayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63
MINN. L. REV. 609 (1979).
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tions without citation to authority141 and cited to the legislative his-
tory of unenacted bills. 142 Other unusual authority included citing a
federal district court's decision from 1878, and then, oddly, the biogra-
phy of the judge who wrote that opinion.14 3
In addition to this historical approach, the Court went on to ex-
amine whether Congress had exercised its plenary power to grant or
deny criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians to the tribes and concluded
that Congress had not.144 This deference to Congress' plenary power
becomes noteworthy when analyzing the double jeopardy and non-
member Indian question. In that analysis, the question whether the
Court has based its decisions concerning criminal jurisdiction and
double jeopardy on constitutional grounds or has created federal com-
mon law in the absence of Congressional action will become a central
question.
Finally, the Oliphant Court held that beyond historical treaties
and Congressional action, it was the status of the tribes as dependent
nations that determined the extent of their sovereignty.l4 5 In other
words, the Court based its decision on the tribes' role as a conquered
nation, dependent on its conqueror, rather than the tribe's role as a
sovereign power. Justice Rehnquist wrote that the tribes were "pro-
hibited from exercising both those powers of autonomous states that
are expressly terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsistent
with their status'" 146 The Court went on to hold that "[u]pon incorpo-
ration into the territory of the United States" the tribes lost the power
to exercise their sovereignty in ways that "conflict with the interests of
this overriding sovereignty."147 The "conflicting interest" of the "over-
riding" sovereign that gave rise to this implicit divestiture, in the con-
text of criminal jurisdiction, was the federal government's interest in
141. For example, the Court stated: "The effort by Indian tribal courts to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, however, is a relatively new phenomenon.
And where the effort has been made in the past, it has been held that the jurisdic-
tion did not exist." Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196-97.
142. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 202-03 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., 18
(1834)).
143. Id. at 199-200. The Court cites to Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353 (W.D. Ark.
1878). In a footnote, the Court cited to the biography of Judge Issac C. Parker,
the judge who wrote the Kehyon opinion. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 200 n.10 (citing
H. CROY, HE HANGED THEM HIGH 222 (1952)). The Court also cited J.GREGORY &
R. STRICKLAND EDS., HELL ON THE BORDER (1971).
144. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203 ("Congress' concern over criminal jurisdiction in this
proposed Indian Territory contrasts markedly with its total failure to address
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on other reservations, which frequently
bordered non-Indian settlements.").
145. Id. at 208.
146. Id. (alteration in original).
147. Id. at 209.
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ensuring the protection of Bill of Rights to non-Indian defendants. 148
Despite the concern with Bill of Rights protections for defendants, the
Court did not mention another safeguard available to protect non-In-
dians whose civil liberties are in jeopardy: the right of defendants to
appeal to a federal court through a habeas petition. 149 The Court's
concern about civil liberties, however, led at least one commentator to
mark the beginning of consent-based jurisdiction, as opposed to terri-
torial-based jurisdiction, to Oliphant and Wheeler.150 Later cases
have characterized the Oliphant analysis as involving an "implicit di-
vestiture of sovereignty."15 1
Many criticize Oliphant's interpretation of the relationship of the
tribes to the federal government as inconsistent with the foundational
precedents of Indian law, such as the Marshall Trilogy, as well as a
departure from the prevailing Congressional view in more recent de-
cades recognizing tribal sovereignty. 1 52 "Incorporation" was precisely
what the Marshall Trilogy avoided. 153 Other commentators accuse
the Oliphant Court of ethnocentric racism. 154 Nonetheless, twelve
years later, the Court would use Oliphant, a shaky foundation of scant
and questionable authority, to build its decision in Duro v. Reina.1 55
3. Duro v. Reina
Duro v. Reina presented the question whether a tribe's criminal
jurisdiction extends to non-member Indians. 156 The case involved Al-
bert Duro, an enrolled member of the Torres-Martinez Band of
Chauilla Mission. Duro allegedly shot and killed a fourteen year-old
148. David H. Getches, BEYOND INDIAN LAw: The Rhenquist Court's Pursuit of States'
Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 332
(2001) ("The Court presumed that the tribes' inherent sovereignty must be lim-
ited because the ability to deprive non-Indians of personal liberties would be "in-
consistent with their status.") (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208).
149. Justice Brennan later points this out in his dissent in Duro, 495 U.S. at 709.
150. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
151. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 686 (1990) (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 326).
152. E.g., Frickey, supra note 107, at 38 ("In short, the Marshall Court considered
tribes subservient to clear assertions of authority deemed necessary for the colo-
nizing government to conduct the colonial process efficiently. Oliphant involved
no conflict of this sort."); Gould, supra note 49, at 68 ("[T]he Court turned John
Marshall's decisions in McIntosh, Cherokee Nation, and Worcester on their
heads.").
153. Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1,
36-43. Ball finds the "incorporation" justified by selective use of authority and
"ethnocentrism" as evidence of the "incapacity for talking openly and honestly
about the injury in our origin." Id. at 42-43.
154. See id. at 42; Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contempo-
rary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of
Federal Indian Law, 31 ARiz. L. REV. 237, 263-65 (1989).
155. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
156. Id. at 679.
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member of the Gila River Indian Tribe within the boundaries of the
Salt River Reservation, home of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa
Tribe.157 After the U.S. Attorney brought a federal indictment that
the federal district court dismissed without prejudice, the defendant
was brought before the Pima-Maricopa Tribal Court on charges of ille-
gal firing of a weapon on the reservation. Duro filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that equal protection principles
precluded the tribe's assertion of jurisdiction over a nonmember In-
dian. Although the District Court for the District of Arizona granted
the motion, the Ninth Circuit reversed.158 The United States Su-
preme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that tribes do not
have jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.159
The Duro Court, with Justice Kennedy writing for the majority,
based its decision on principles announced in both Wheeler and Oli-
phant,160 and this attempt to reconcile the two cases has led to criti-
cism.16 1 When addressing Wheeler, the Court emphasized that the
sovereignty recognized by the Wheeler Court was limited to "internal
self-governance."162 If the prosecution involved "external relations be-
tween the Tribe and outsiders, such power would have been inconsis-
tent with the Tribe's dependent status."'16 3 The Court characterized
the Oliphant ruling as a recognition that "tribes can no longer be de-
scribed as sovereigns in [the territorial] sense".164
The consent theory of jurisdiction introduced in Wheeler and Oli-
phant came to full fruition in Duro. The Court found that the tribes'
exercise of criminal jurisdiction governed only internal affairs, and
was justified only by the "voluntary character of tribal membership
and the concomitant right of participation in a tribal government, the
authority of which rests on consent."165 As in Oliphant, the Court fo-
cused on the "more direct intrusion on personal liberties" in the crimi-
nal jurisdiction context. The Court distinguished cases involving civil
jurisdiction 166 and noted that, as a nonmember, the defendant was
157. Id.
158. Id. at 682.
159. Id. at 679.
160. Id. at 684.
161. See, e.g., Skibine, supra note 15, at 781. Professor Skibine concludes: "The ulti-
mate fallacy of Duro is that it attempts to use the faulty analysis of Wheeler to
arbitrarily include criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians as an exercise
of external sovereignty." Id.
162. Duro, 495 U.S. at 686.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 685.
165. Id. at 694.
166. Id. at 687-88.
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not eligible to vote, hold office or serve on a jury in the tribal court,
which put him in the same position as a non-Indian.167
But in contrast to Oliphant, in which historical arguments formed
the basis of the opinion, the Duro majority rejected the historical ar-
guments which the tribes and amici offered in support of jurisdiction.
The tribes offered examples of the broad use of the word "Indian" in
the United States Code and Supreme Court precedent, but the Duro
Court rejected the examples as "somewhat less illuminating than in
Oliphant," and tending to support the opposite conclusion.168 Fur-
ther, the Court rejected the tribes' argument that denying the tribes
jurisdiction over nonmembers would leave a jurisdictional void when
nonmembers committed minor crimes in Indian Country by making
reference to the fact that tribes could agree to states assuming juris-
diction through Pub. L. 280.169
In reaching its own conclusion, the Court cited to opinions of the
Solicitor of the Department of Interior during the period in which as-
similation, not tribal sovereignty, was the federal policy,17o as well as
cases from the allotment era. 171 The Court also stated that the ten-
dency of the government to treat Indians as one large class, without
distinguishing between members and nonmember Indians, was not
dispositive in a case examining tribal, and not federal, power.1 72 Fi-
nally, the Court repeated that protection of personal liberties trumped
the historical record, stating, "[wihatever might be said of the histori-
cal record, we must view it in light of petitioner's status as a citizen of
the United States."173
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, carefully
answered the arguments of the majority, emphasizing Congress' role
in determining jurisdiction. First, Brennan characterized the major-
ity's view of tribes "implicitly surrender[ing]" jurisdiction as a "parsi-
monious" view of tribal sovereignty. 174 Brennan rejected the
majority's position that Oliphant limited the tribe to consent-based ju-
167. Id. Note, however, that the same situation would be true if a citizen of Nevada
were prosecuted in a California court. The Nevada citizen would not be eligible to
vote in California, hold office in California or serve on a California jury. The lack
of participation on the part of the Nevada citizen in the California government
does not preclude California courts from exercising jurisdiction.
168. Id. at 688-89.
169. Id. at 697; see also infra notes 186-190, and accompanying text.
170. Id. at 691-92 (citing opinions of the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior in
the 1930's).
171. Id. One student observer notes that the Court cites to Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1981) which interprets the abandoned allotment policy. Alisa Cook
Lauer, Dispelling the Constitutional Creation Myth of Tribal Sovereignty, Unites
States v. Weaselhead, 78 NEB. L. REV. 162, 193 (1999).
172. Duro, 495 U.S. at 689-90.
173. Id. at 692.
174. Id. at 698 ( Brennan, J., dissenting).
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risdiction, finding instead that the holding in Oliphant was based on
examining "Congress' actions with respect to non-Indians."'175 Bren-
nan presented a different view of history, noting that Congress often
distinguished between Indians and non-Indians, but rarely distin-
guished between member and nonmember Indians.1 76
As the Court addresses the question of double jeopardy and non-
member Indians, one of the questions it will face is whether the deci-
sion is founded on the Constitution or on federal common law. The
Duro Court cited neither a constitutional provision nor a federal stat-
ute as the legal authority for its holding. However, the opinion con-
cludes with a statement of deference to Congress' plenary power and a
reiteration of the Court's focus on the equal treatment of citizens. 1 77
Although most scholars agree that Duro was not constitutionally
based, 178 some see the possibility of re-interpreting the opinion to find
a constitutional basis.179 Others admit that it is a difficult prediction
to make. 180
As Oliphant before it had created a firestorm of criticism, scholars
responded to Duro with dismay, finding it unprincipled judicial activ-
ism 8 1 based on insubstantial authority.182 Even more significant,
175. Id. at 700-01.
176. Id. at 702-04. The dissent also carefully examined the majority's use of authority.
In addition to noting the ways in which the majority misread Oliphant, Brennan
pointed out that Wheeler involved an enrolled member before his own tribal court
and thus, the majority relied on dicta - statements from Wheeler concerning what
the court would do if a nonmember Indian were before it. Id. at 700 n.1.
177. The final paragraph of the majority opinion gives support to both theories when it
states:
If the present jurisdictional scheme proves insufficient to meet the prac-
tical needs of reservation law enforcement, then the proper body to ad-
dress the problem is Congress, which has the ultimate authority over
Indian affairs. We cannot, however, accept these arguments of policy as
a basis for finding tribal jurisdiction that is inconsistent with precedent,
history, and the equal treatment of Native American citizens. The judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed.
Id. at 698. Thus, one could read the opinion as anticipating deference to Con-
gress ("which has the ultimate authority over Indian affairs") or as based on indi-
vidual rights ("inconsistent with . . . equal treatment of Native American
citizens").
178. See, e.g., Pommersheim, supra note 9, at 279; Newton, supra note 15, at 113. But
see, Skibine, supra note 15, at 784 ("Because a strong possibility exists that the
Court will view its decision as having been made on constitutional grounds, at
least in a structural or organic sense . . ").
179. Deloria and Newton, supra note 18, at 74. Professor Newton notes that "the opin-
ion is greatly influenced by constitutional values," and speculates that the Court
could decide that the tribes are merely a subsidiary of the federal government,
and "are therefore bound to the same constitutional limitations ... as are agen-
cies of government." Id.
180. Frickey, supra note 107, at 41-42.
181. E.g., Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes,
34 ARiz. ST. L.J. 113, 223-24 (2002).
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however, were the practical concerns, most prominently the jurisdic-
tional void left by Duro, raised by scholars, tribes and politicians.1S3
Congress responded to the outcry and a year later amended the Indian
Civil Rights Act to resolve the issue of jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians in what has become known as "the Duro override," or "the
Duro fix."1s4
D. Separation of Powers and the Duro Override
The outcry about the Duro decision was considerable. One particu-
lar criticism was the jurisdictional void it created over lesser crimes
committed by nonmember Indians in Indian Country. Unless the
state had Public Law 280 jurisdiction, the state could not prosecute
nonmember Indians.1S5 Tribes could not prosecute nonmember Indi-
ans or non-Indians. The federal government had jurisdiction over all
Indians in the fourteen crimes of the Major Crimes Act, but not over
lesser crimes.18 6 Thus, if tribes were without jurisdiction over non-
member Indians for the lesser crimes under Duro, no one had jurisdic-
tion to prosecute. 18 7
Professor Nell Jessup Newton, an active participant in drafting the
Duro override and lobbying in its favor, has described the legislative
182. David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1634 (1996). Getches notes
that the opinion "indulged in a search for historical indicators as to how Indian
sovereignty should be treated, rather than a search for Congressional limita-
tions." Id.
183. Newton, supra note 15, at 109.
184. Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1892 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2002)).
185. Public Law 280 gave specific states criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country.
When Congress required tribal consent for a state to assume jurisdiction, almost
no states have been added to the list of fifteen states with Public Law 280 juris-
diction. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
187. The tribes made this argument in the Duro brief, and the Court dismissed it by
suggesting that tribes could negotiate reciprocal jurisdictional agreements with
other tribes, and by reference to Public Law 280, discussed supra at note 127 and
accompanying text. The Court stated,
Our decision today does not imply endorsement of the theory of a juris-
dictional void presented by respondents and the court below. States
may, with the consent of the tribes, assist in maintaining order on the
reservation by punishing minor crime. Congress has provided a mecha-
nism by which the States now without jurisdiction in Indian country
may assume criminal jurisdiction through Pub. L. 280. Our decision
here also does not address the ability of neighboring tribal governments
that share law enforcement concerns to enter into reciprocal agreements
giving each jurisdiction over the other's members. As to federal jurisdic-
tion under § 1152, both academic commentators and the dissenting
judge below have suggested that the statute could be construed to cover
the conduct here.
Duro, 495 U.S. at 697 (citation omitted).
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process in detail.'ss Not only did the tribes denounce the decision, but
the Western Governors Association, and the states of Arizona, Mon-
tana, Nevada, North Dakota, and South Dakota passed resolutions
asking Congress to address the problem.' 8 9 Not all agreed that Con-
gress should give tribes jurisdiction over nonmember Indians; for ex-
ample the Western Attorneys General urged Congress to grant the
states jurisdiction. 190
Congress addressed the problem by adding a rider to an appropria-
tion bill that temporarily amended the definitions section of the In-
dian Civil Rights Act. 191 The amendment concerning the power of the
tribe currently reads:
"[Plowers of self-government" means and includes all governmental powers
possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all of-
fices, bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are executed, including
courts of Indian offenses; and means the inherent power of Indian tribe,
hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians. 192
Significantly, the language of the amendment "recognizes" the "inher-
ent" tribal power. It purports to acknowledge jurisdiction, rather than
grant or delegate jurisdiction. Whether Congress has recognized or
delegated jurisdiction will become a key question in the double jeop-
ardy for nonmembers analysis.
It was necessary for Congress to define "Indian" for the purposes of
the override, and Congress did that by referring to how courts have
interpreted the Major Crimes Act: "'Indian' means any person who
would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as an Indian
under section 1153, title 18, if that person were to commit an offense
listed in that section in Indian country to which that section ap-
plies."19 3 Section 1153 refers to the Major Crimes Act, which does not
188. See generally Newton, supra note 15.
189. Id. at 110. Newton reports elsewhere that the Western Governors' Association
"expressed concern that states may not be able to fill the jurisdictional gap cre-
ated by Duro, and asked Congress to hold hearings in the west on the impact of
the case." Deloria and Newton, supra note 16, at 73 (citing West. Govs. Ass'n
Res. 90-014 (July 17, 1990)).
190. Newton, supra note 15, at 110.
191. Id. at 111. Delori and Newton write that Congress has used appropriations rid-
ers to make Indian policy before. Deloria and Newton, supra note 18, at 51. Fur-
ther, the choice to amend the Indian Civil Rights Act was a deliberate effort to
avoid the appearance of Congress delegating jurisdiction, rather than recognizing
jurisdiction derived from inherent sovereignty. 'Congress thus chose to correct
the Court's misreading of congressional intent, and, in a sense, overturn Duro."
Newton, supra note 15, at 111-12.
192. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000).
193. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2000).
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define "Indian," leaving definition to the courts. 19 4 In 1991, Congress
made the Duro override a permanent solution.1 95
The Duro override raises serious constitutional questions involving
separation of powers. 19 6 Before deciding whether the tribes' source of
jurisdiction is that of a separate sovereign for purposes of the Dual
Sovereignty exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court will
need to decide whether the tribes have jurisdiction at all. The consti-
tutional question is which branch of government has the power to de-
cide whether the tribe has jurisdiction. There is no provision in the
Constitution addressing jurisdiction of Indian tribes. The treaty
power is given in part to Congress,19 7 and the Court has recognized
that Congress has plenary power over the tribes.198 Hence, generally
speaking, when federal courts determine the limits of tribal jurisdic-
tion, if they make that determination in the absence of legislative en-
actment, they do so as a matter of federal common law.199
Professor Martha Field, a noted scholar on the question of federal
common law suggests that no definition of federal common law is "in-
herently correct," but for practical purposes she has defined it broadly
as "any rule of federal law, created by a court.., when the substance
of that rule is not clearly suggested by federal enact-
ments-constitutional or congressional."200 Thus, in Oliphant and
Duro, when the Court searched fruitlessly for Congress' pronounce-
ment on the issues, and was left to interpret congressional intent, the
Court was deciding the issue as a matter of federal common law. And
if the decision was a matter of federal common law, Congress was per-
fectly within its authority when it decided to correct the Court, and to
"override" or to "fix" Duro.20 1 For the Court to resist Congress' power
to modify the decision would be for the Court to usurp the legislative
function, because common law can be replaced by statutes. The Court
194. The Major Crimes Act gives federal jurisdiction over 14 felonies if committed in
Indian Country. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
195. Professor Newton gives an informative account of the complex political negotia-
tions necessary to secure passage of the permanent legislation. Newton, supra
note 15, at 114-117.
196. The issue also raises questions of equal protection. See supra note 15.
197. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
198. See supra note 88.
199. See National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 857.
200. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 881, 890 (1986) (footnote omitted). Professor Field states that "the area can-
not be delimited by any clear-cut line" and "includes much we think of as inter-
pretation." Id. at 893-94.
201. Professor Field discusses federal common law in the context of Federal Indian
Law, looking back to the Marshall trilogy. She concludes that in this area the
opinions "stress that the adoption of preexisting common law is subject to modifi-
cation by Congress." Id. at 949.
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cannot usurp the legislative function without offending separation of
powers principles.
If, on the other hand, the Supreme Court based its decision in Duro
on constitutional grounds, then it was properly exercising its power of
constitutional judicial review. In that case, Congress might not have
the power to interfere, override, or fix Duro in any way.2 0 2 Conse-
quently, tribal courts would have no criminal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians and the Double Jeopardy question would not arise.
Duro allows for either possibility, although most scholars find that
it is not constitutionally based.203 As discussed supra, it cites no Con-
stitutional provision but rather seeks evidence of Congressional in-
tent. The Court's rationale in Duro raises constitutional questions,
however, because it focuses on the defendant's inability to participate
in the system, and the absence of the full Bill of Rights protection in
the proceeding. It is a difficult question, and one that has divided the
Circuit Courts of Appeals.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLITS
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits are divided on the issue of tribal
court jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. The Eighth Circuit has
addressed the question twice. In United States v. Weaselhead,2 04 the
court, sitting en banc, split evenly on the question. More recently, in
United States v. Lara,20 5 a majority emerged to hold that the Double
Jeopardy Clause precluded successive tribal/federal prosecution. In
the interim, however, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v.
Enas2o 6 that multiple prosecutions are permissible under the dual
sovereignty exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause.
202. See City of Bourne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529-36 (1997) (holding that the Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded Congress' enforcement powers under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
203. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
204. United States v. Weaselhead, 165 F.3d 1209 (1999) (per curiam) (en banc). In
United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 1998), the 8th Circuit re-
versed a district court's decision to deny defendant's motion and held that the
dual sovereignty limitation could not prevent the application of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause in preventing the government from prosecuting the defendant. Id. at
824. The 8th Circuit, in United States v. Weaselhead, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
30874, vacated its opinion and granted a rehearing on the issue. The per curiam
opinion follows the vacated opinion and affirmed the original district court's rul-
ing that defendants motion to dismiss the criminal charge based on the Double
Jeopardy Clause should be denied. The discussion that follows infra refers to the
156 F.3d 818 opinion that upheld the defendant's motion and denied prosecution
based on the Double Jeopardy Clause.
205. 324 F.3d 635, 640 (8th Cir. 2003).
206. 255 F.3d 662, 675 (9th Cir. 2001).
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A. Weaselhead and Lara
The circumstances before the Eighth Circuit in Weaselhead and
Lara were similar. In both cases an Indian enrolled in one tribe was
prosecuted in the tribal court of another tribe. In Weaselhead an en-
rolled member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe of Montana agreed to
plead no contest in Winnebago tribal court to one count of sexual as-
sault.207 On the same day that he entered his plea, Weaselhead was
indicted in federal court on a charge of engaging in a sexual act with
an Indian juvenile. Weaselhead moved to dismiss based on double
jeopardy grounds.208
Similarly, in United States v. Lara, a nonmember Indian was con-
victed in the Spirit Lake Nation Reservation tribal court of assaulting
a police officer.209 Subsequently, Lara was charged with assaulting a
federal officer and moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy
grounds.210
The reasoning in both opinions followed the same pattern. The
opinions first examined the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine and observed
that the application "turns on whether the two entities draw their au-
thority to punish the offender from distinct sources of power,"2 11
which would preclude applying the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine.
Next, the opinions discussed the recent cases concerning criminal
jurisdiction, double jeopardy and the nature of tribal sovereignty, us-
ing Oliphant, Wheeler, and Duro to trace the emergence of the princi-
ple that in criminal matters, the tribe's sovereignty extends only to
those who have consented to jurisdiction by enrolling as members.212
The opinions recounted Congress' response to Duro, noting that Con-
gress attempted to "recognize[] and affirm[]" the tribes' "inherent
power" rather than to delegate criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians. 2 13 The Lara majority opinion went on to observe that the
Supreme Court had not yet addressed the Duro override, but that the
Court had decided several post-Duro and post-Duro override cases
that had reaffirmed limiting tribes to consent jurisdiction. Lara relied
on Montana v. United States,2 14 as well as three later cases that built
207. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d at 819. Weaselhead, nineteen years old, entered into a sex-
ual relationship with a fourteen year-old Winnebago girl. Id.
208. Id.
209. Lara, 324 F.3d at 636.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 637 (quoting Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985)); Weaselhead, 156
F.3d at 820.
212. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d at 821-23; Lara, 324 F.3d. at 637-38.
213. Lara, 324 F.3d at 638; Weaselhead, 156 F.3d at 823.
214. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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on the Montana rationale, Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,2 15 Ne-
vada v. Hicks2 16, and Dakota v. Bourland.2 17
In Montana, written around the time of Oliphant and Wheeler, the
Court rejected tribal claims of treaty rights and inherent sovereignty
to hold that the tribe did not retain sovereignty to regulate hunting
and fishing by nonmembers on land owned in fee by nonmembers. 2 18
Scott Gould characterizes Montana as "a more fundamental change in
federal Indian law than the changes worked in Oliphant," because
under Oliphant tribes retained power until divested, but under Mon-
tana "tribes had sovereign powers only over consenting members un-
less greater powers were conferred by Congress."2 19
The Montana general rule that the inherent sovereignty of tribes
does not extend to nonmembers admitted two exceptions. 2 20 First, if
nonmembers enter a consensual relationship with the tribe, the tribe
may regulate their activities. Second, a tribe may regulate "the con-
duct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that con-
duct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."2 21 The lan-
guage concerning a direct effect on the tribe's political integrity, eco-
nomic security, or health or welfare gave some who support the tribe
cause to hope, but the later cases of Nevada, Bourland, and Atkinson
have interpreted that language narrowly.
Bourland, Atkinson, and Nevada, all cases decided after the Duro
override and cited by the Eighth Circuit in Lara, apply the Montana
test to determine regulatory or civil jurisdiction. Bourland addressed
the question of tribal regulation of hunting and fishing rights on Chey-
enne River reservation land that Congress had appropriated for flood
control purposes, holding that if Congress abrogates a treaty that gave
the tribe control for any reason, the tribe loses the power to regulate
nonmembers. 2 22 Most recently, Atkinson held the Navajo tribe could
not impose a hotel occupancy tax on a hotel owned in fee by nonmem-
bers on non-Indian fee land within the reservation.22 3 It is notewor-
thy, however, that even in the more recent cases, the Court sometimes
uses the term "members" and "nonmembers," but other times seems to
use "nonmember" and " non-Indian" indiscriminately. 224 Neverthe-
215. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
216. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
217. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
218. 450 U.S. at 564-65.
219. Gould, supra note 15, at 875.
220. 450 U.S. at 565-66.
221. Id.
222. 508 U.S. at 695.
223. 532 U.S. at 659.
224. For example, within one paragraph of its discussion of Bourland, the Court first
uses the term "members." The Court states: "Although Indian tribes retain in-
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less, these regulatory cases are important, because if the Court has
reaffirmed its commitment to the principle of tribal members-only ju-
risdiction in the civil context, it is much more likely to reaffirm that
principle in the criminal context where the stakes are higher for indi-
vidual rights.
Although Nevada v. Hicks also was a civil suit, it had implications
in the criminal law context. Hicks addressed whether a tribal court
had jurisdiction over civil suits against state officials who executed
search warrants on Indian-owned land against an Indian defen-
dant.2 25 In part the Court applied the Montana test to conclude that
"tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process related
to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal
self-government or internal relations-to 'the right to make laws and
be ruled by them."'226 The Court's opinion gave little deference to the
fact that the incidents in the case occurred on Indian owned and In-
dian controlled land. There were several concurrences filed. In one,
Justice O'Connor rejected the idea of a "per se rule of tribal jurisdic-
tion that fails to consider adequately the Tribes' inherent sovereign
interests in activities on their land," and she expressed worry that the
decision "would give nonmembers freedom to act with impunity on tri-
bal land based solely on their status as state law enforcement offi-
cials." 22 7 Allowing state law enforcement officials to act with
impunity on reservation land takes tribal sovereignty a long way from
the Marshall trilogy. The Eighth Circuit, perhaps correctly, read the
recent cases as continuing support for non-geographic members-only
jurisdiction. To the Eighth Circuit these cases underscored the point
that the Duro override had not led the Court to abandon its view of
nonmember jurisdiction.
In regard to the central question of whether Duro is a constitu-
tional law decision, the Lara court made clear that it considers the
decision concerning sovereignty to be "of constitutional magnitude,"2 28
and not a matter of federal common law. The court stated, "[Wle con-
clude that the distinction between a tribe's inherent and delegated
powers is of constitutional magnitude and therefore is a matter ulti-
mately entrusted to the Supreme Court."22 9 The court reasoned that
herent authority to punish members who violate tribal law..." and then later in
the same paragraph writes, "(h)aving concluded that Congress clearly abrogated
the Tribe's pre-existing regulatory control over non-Indian hunting and fishing,
we find no evidence in the relevant treaties or statutes that Congress intended to
allow the Tribe to assert regulatory jurisdiction over these lands pursuant to in-
herent sovereignty." 508 U.S. at 695.
225. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
226. Id. at 364.
227. Id. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring).




references to Congress' plenary power, based in the government's
trust in responsibility for the tribes, were waning, while references to
the Indian Commerce Clause were increasing.2 30 Nevertheless, ac-
cording to Lara, the fact that Duro was constitutionally based did not
serve to void the ICRA amendments that Congress passed as the Duro
override. 23 1 Instead, the constitutional basis of Duro provided the ra-
tionale for finding that Congress could delegate jurisdictional author-
ity to the tribe after Duro, but it could not recognize a pre-existing
power. The Weaselhead panel reasoned that "ascertainment of first
principles regarding the position of Indian tribes within our constitu-
tional structure of government is a matter ultimately entrusted to the
Court and thus beyond the scope of Congress's authority to alter retro-
actively by legislative fiat."232 As the Eighth Circuit explained in
Weaselhead, criminal jurisdiction that existed prior to Duro was sur-
rendered to the "overriding sovereignty of the United States" when the
Court spoke.23 3 Congress had the power to restore the jurisdiction,
but the restoration, at that point, was a delegation. Therefore, the
majority found that tribal courts and federal courts share the same
source of sovereignty, and the dual sovereignty exception did not
apply.23 4
Judge Morris Shepard Arnold wrote the dissenting opinion in both
Weaselhead and Lara. Judge Arnold's disdain for the idea that only
the Court can determine what sovereign powers the tribes inherently
possess is palpable. In Weaselhead, Judge Arnold wrote, "I cannot lo-
cate any such legal principle in the relevant cases or in the Constitu-
tion."235 He further wrote, "The Constitution is simply silent on the
matter" and "the question of what powers Indian tribes inherently
possess . . .has always been a matter of federal common law."23 6
Thus, the dissent found the power to "expand and contract the inher-
ent sovereignty that Indian tribes possess" belonged to Congress, and
because the tribe was exercising inherent sovereignty, the Dual Sover-
eignty Doctrine allowed successive tribal/federal prosecution. 23 7
In Lara, Judge Arnold elaborated on his reasoning from
Weaselhead. He rejected the notion that basing Congress' plenary
power in the Indian Commerce Clause limits congressional authority,
analogizing to the fact that Congress retains the power to reverse the
230. Id. at 640 ("[Rleferences to [plenary power as a corollary to the trust responsibil-
ity] have largely been supplanted by a reliance on the commerce power.").
231. Id. ("Nothing in our decision today in any way circumscribes the jurisdiction so
conferred [by the ICRA amendments].").
232. 156 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 1998).
233. Id. (quoting Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990)).
234. Id.





court's decision invalidating a state law based on the Dormant Com-
merce Clause.2 38 And the dissent distinguished the post-Duro over-
ride cases of Bourland and Hicks by observing that they did not
involve amendments similar to the ICRA amendments that Congress
passed to correct Duro.23 9 Judge Arnold concluded that with respect
to whether Congress could recognize the tribes' inherent sovereignty,
"the only possible answer to that question is that Congress can do
what it quite plainly sought to do here."240 The Ninth Circuit, sitting
en banc, agreed with Judge Arnold.
B. United States v. Enas
Enas involved an enrolled member of the San Carlos Apache Tribe,
who stabbed an enrolled member of the White Mountain Apache
Tribe, while on the White Mountain Apache Reservation. 24 1 Enas
was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to 180
days in jail and a fine of $1180. Nearly a year later, based on the
same facts, a federal grand jury indicted Enas again with assault with
a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury.
Enas responded with a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy
grounds. The trial court granted the Enas motion and dismissed the
case.2 42 A three-judge panel reversed the trial court, and the Ninth
Circuit agreed to hear the issue en banc. The circuit court found that
double jeopardy did not bar the claim.24 3
The court applied the test for the dual sovereignty exception, ana-
lyzing Duro and the Duro override to decide whether the source of
power for the tribal court was separate from the source of power for
the federal court.24 4 The majority opinion made several points in ad-
dition to the lack of constitutional language 24 5 on which Judge Arnold
had focused in the Weaselhead panel dissent 24 6 and the Lara dis-
sent.2 47 First, the Enas court noticed that in Duro, the Supreme
Court "used terms with a temporal component" throughout the Duro
opinion, which led the Ninth Circuit to emphasize the historical na-
238. 324 F.3d at 645 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 646.
241. United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 2001).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 675.
244. Id. at 668-71.
245. The majority opinion clearly agreed with Judge Arnold when it stated: "To hold,
as did the Weaselhead panel majority, that this is a constitutional issue ignores
the glaring omission of constitutional discourse from Duro, Oliphant, and
Wheeler. It would be extraordinary indeed if those were constitutional decisions
that simply neglected to mention the Constitution." Id. at 674.
246. 156 F.3d at 824-25 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
247. 324 F.3d at 641-46 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
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ture of the Supreme Court's analysis.2 48 Regarding the historical ap-
proach in Duro, the circuit court noted that the Supreme Court in
Duro was at times "equivocal," and "even acknowledged that the his-
torical record was not crystal clear."24 9
Then the Ninth Circuit turned to the Duro override, and made two
points about the override. First, the Ninth Circuit found that Con-
gress clearly intended that tribes would have jurisdiction over all Indi-
ans, whether members or not.2 50 Second, the court found that
Congress explicitly intended to replace the history set out in Duro,
with a different history that would recognize a power that always ex-
isted.2 5 1 Then, on the basis of the conflict between Duro and the Duro
override, the Ninth Circuit went on to a separation of powers
analysis.252
The majority opinion began its separation of powers analysis by
reviewing definitions of federal common law, admitting that "'history'
falls outside of the usual litany of authorities controlled by designated
branches of government."253 But the majority concluded that Duro
was indeed federal common law, and "within the realm of federal com-
mon law-and the federal common law of tribes-Congress is supreme.
Consequently, Congress had the power to do exactly what it intended
when it enacted the 1990 amendments to the ICRA."254 The court
warned however, of a "major limitation" on the Enas decision-that
Congress cannot "override a constitutional decision by rewriting the
history upon which it is based."255
248. 255 F.3d at 668 ("In reaching this conclusion, the Court undertook the historical
approach previously employed in Wheeler, examining whether this was a form of
power that was 'necessarily divested' at the time of the tribe's 'incorporation
within the territory of the United States.'" (quoting United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313 (1978))).
249. Id. at 669.
250. Id. at 669.
251. Id.
252. The majority opinion also used a section of the opinion to address other cases
dealing with the relationship between Duro and the Duro override. This discus-
sion included an earlier case from the Ninth Circuit, Means v. Northern Cheyenne
Tribal Court, 154 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 1998) (overruled by Enas, 255 F.3d 662).
Means considered the issue of whether the ICRA amendments (the Duro over-
ride) applied retroactively. In Means, the Ninth Circuit decided that Congress
could not "legislatively overrule" Duro because Congress could not "somehow
erase" Duro. Id. at 946. In Enas, however, the Ninth Circuit comes to the oppo-
site conclusion, and notes that "Means is overruled to the extent that it held that
Congress did not have such power. We do not disturb, however, the holding of
Means regarding retroactivity and the Ex Post Facto Clause." Enas, 255 F.3d at
675 n.8 (citations omitted).
253. Enas, 255 F.3d at 674. Further, the court states that "[iut would be disingenuous
to suggest that this questions [of what constitutes federal common law] presents
a simple answer." Id.
254. Id. at 675 (citation omitted).
255. Id. (emphasis added).
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Unlike the Eighth Circuit where the court was deeply divided, the
Ninth Circuit unanimously agreed that the Double Jeopardy Clause
did not bar the claim. The judges did not agree, however, on the ratio-
nale supporting the outcome; seven were in the majority, and four
judges filed a concurrence. 2 56 The concurring opinion took the posi-
tion that no separation of powers analysis was necessary because
Duro was a "snapshot" of tribal authority at the time the Court de-
cided it. As a snapshot it was not inconsistent with the Duro override,
but simply waiting for Congress to exercise its plenary power.25 7 The
concurrence supported this view by pointing out that if the tribe prose-
cuted first, and double jeopardy principles barred successive prosecu-
tions, the maximum sentence a defendant could face would be severely
limited under ICRA-a result Congress did not likely intend.2 58 Fur-
ther, Judge Pregerson, who wrote for the concurring judges, found the
position that there was no conflict between Duro and the Duro over-
ride "consistent with the general structure of federal criminal law as it
relates to Indians," including other federal statutes and the Courts of
Indian Offenses. 25 9
Thus, the judges of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, as well as In-
dian law scholars, have come to differing conclusions about how the
question of successive prosecutions after Duro should be decided, and
how to support that decision. The circuits are split on a question that
involves the criminal law, Indian law, and the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari.
This Article turns now to setting out the choices that will face the
Court.
IV. THE CHOICES BEFORE THE COURT
The choices before the Court concerning the issues involved in
Weaselhead, Lara, and Enas are complicated. Easy solutions that fol-
low familiar patterns are few. Scholars have long sought a cohesive
theory to explain American Indian Law and to serve as a framework
for making Indian law decisions, but for the most part the search has
been in vain.2 60 Moreover, Indian law issues habitually test the dura-
256. Id. at 664, 676.
257. Id. at 679 (Pregerson, J., concurring).
258. Id. at 681.
259. Id.
260. Nathan Margold, author of the introduction to Cohen's Indian Law Handbook
remarks that without a historical perspective, Indian law is" a mystifying collec-
tion of inconsistencies and anachronisms." Nathan R. Margold, Introduction to
FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW xxvii (1942); see also Philip
Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal
Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1754 (1997) ("If the 'life of the law' for legal
formalists is logic and for legal pragmatists is experience, then federal Indian law
is for neither."); Laurie Reynolds, Adjudication in Indian Country: The Confusing
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bility of traditional theories of judicial philosophy because remaining
true to one philosophy will often lead a decision-maker to hard-to-live-
with outcomes. 26 1 Jurists of all persuasions, whether usually labeled
conservative or liberal, can face this problem. Many who are ordina-
rily textualists would like to limit the power of the tribes, but find
little or no text upon which to base a decision. Originalists are stuck
with a history that would show greater deference to the tribe than
most would like to give in a modern world. And those usually labeled
liberal would like outcomes that honor promises made to respect the
sovereignty of the tribes, but may be deeply disturbed at ignoring indi-
vidual rights and liberties in favor of group identity. The decision the
Supreme Court must make to resolve the circuit split on the question
of nonmember Indians, criminal jurisdiction, and the Double Jeopardy
Clause illustrates this dilemma. This section will analyze the choices
before the Court.
One option that would settle the questions of double jeopardy
would be to discard the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine altogether, and
thus to decide that any successive prosecution would violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Supreme Court precedent binds lower
courts to the doctrine, but if the question comes before the Supreme
Court, the Court is bound only by stare decisis, and it could decide that
the doctrine should no longer apply. The doctrine is inconsistent with
the plain language of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Many have criti-
cized it as contrary to the common law at the time the Constitution
was drafted and thus contrary to the intent of the Founders. 26 2 Thus,
jurists who prize fidelity to the plain meaning of the text or to the
intent of the Founders would find discarding the doctrine consistent
with that judicial philosophy. But discarding the doctrine would have
implications far beyond Indian Country. Because the doctrine is so
well established, and because discarding the doctrine would have far
reaching consequences in other contexts such as federal and state law
enforcement, it is unlikely that the Court will decide to discard the
doctrine. Therefore, for purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed
the Court will continue to apply the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine and
focus on the Indian Law choices the Court faces.
As outlined above, one of the central questions before the Court is
to clarify the role of the Supreme Court and Congress in deciding the
Parameters of State, Federal, and Tribal Jurisdiction, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
539, 578 (1997) ("[Clonsistencies, symmetry, and uniformity have never been
highly valued in the constantly changing field of Indian law.").
261. Determining what role Congress and the Court should play in deciding the future
of tribal sovereignty raises questions of how Indian law decisions fit into modern
jurisprudential philosophies. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 107.
262. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, The Rodney King Trials and the Double Jeopardy
Clause: Some Observations on Original Meaning and the ACLU's Schizophrenic
Views of the Dual Sovereign Doctrine, 41 UCLA. L. REV. 693 (1994).
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source of jurisdictional power, or in other words, to determine how to
interpret Duro and the Duro override.
A. The Court Could Decide that Duro is Constitutionally
Based
The Court may find that Duro is constitutionally based, as the
Eighth Circuit did in Lara.26 3 There is significant support in the lan-
guage of Duro for finding a constitutional basis for the opinion. For
example, the Duro Court stated, "We hesitate to adopt a view of tribal
sovereignty that would single out another group of citizens, nonmem-
ber Indians, for trial by political bodies that do not include them. As
full citizens, Indians share in the territorial and political sovereignty
of the United States."2 64 Other language supporting a constitutional
grounding for Duro is this statement from the Court: "Our cases sug-
gest constitutional limitations even on the ability of Congress to sub-
ject American citizens to criminal proceedings before a tribunal that
does not provide constitutional protections as a matter of right."265
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit in Lara found Duro was constitution-
ally based because "[tihe Supreme Court has suggested that we must
be guided in part by structural principles that are both implicit and
explicit in the Constitution."2 66
There are many problems, however, with finding a constitutional
basis for the decision. The Eighth Circuit must rely on "implicit struc-
tural principles," of course, because nowhere does the Constitution
make explicit statements concerning the sovereignty of Indian tribes.
While structural approaches are common enough in Indian law cases,
some jurists may find little comfort there. If a jurist seeks guidance
from the plain meaning of the text; or from the intent of the Founders,
"implicit structural principles" may sound as boundless as the
"penumbras" and "interstices" in which the Supreme Court has found
the right to privacy.
In essence, this double jeopardy issue presents to the Court the
same questions that faced Justice Marshall in the first Indian law
cases-the nature of the sovereignty of the conquered tribes, the rela-
263. 324 F.3d 635, 639 (2003).
264. 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990).
265. Id. Here, the Court cites to Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), in which a plurality
held that military tribunals had no jurisdiction over civilian dependents of mili-
tary personnel stationed overseas where no jury trial was available. Id. at 23.
Philip Frickey observes that the citation to Reid "suggests the extent to which the
Court in Duro viewed tribal prosecution of nonmembers as bizarre." Frickey,
supra note 107, at 40. Frickey goes on to analyze the Court's comparison of the
tribal courts, subject to habeas corpus review and where ICRA imposes most of
the protections of the Bill of Rights (except for right to counsel) to military tribu-
nals where few of those safeguards are in place. Id.
266. 324 F.3d at 640.
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tionship between the conquerors and the vanquished, and where to
situate the power of deciding what role the tribes would play in the
nation. 267 Other than the Indian Commerce Clause,268 the Constitu-
tion is silent about the tribes. Without the anchor of constitutional
principles, the source of power was a difficult question for the Court in
Johnson v. McIntosh.26 9 Justice Marshall grounded the case in the
"Doctrine of Discovery,"2 70 a doctrine not derived from constitutional
principles, but instead based in European medieval history. 2 71 Jus-
tice Rehnquist grounded Oliphant, one of the building blocks of Duro,
in history as well. The problem with using history as authority for
Supreme Court decisions is that it may be even more malleable and
more subject to changing interpretation than text-based interpreta-
tion. One example of the malleability of history is Oliphant's depar-
ture from the view of history presented in the Marshall Trilogy. More
recently though in a different context, the Court changed its view of
historical support for anti-sodomy laws within a relatively short pe-
riod of seventeen years when it overturned Bowers v. Hardwick2 72 in
Lawrence v. Texas.2 73
Moreover, finding a constitutional basis for Duro would not only
implicitly reject the Marshall Trilogy and other Supreme Court prece-
dent that acknowledges tribal sovereignty, but it would make it diffi-
cult for the Court to avoid explicitly overruling Talton v. Mayes,2 74
and to avoid seriously limiting the Plenary Power Doctrine.275 Talton
was cited by the Duro Court for the proposition that the Bill of Rights
does not apply to the tribes.276 In Duro, the Court makes a distinc-
tion between how the federal government may treat nonmembers In-
267. Frank Pommersheim notes that the constitutional status of tribes has been "elu-
sive from the very beginning," yet "[d]espite this acknowledgment, the Court pro-
ceeded then, and has ever since, to routinely decide cases about the nature of
tribal sovereignty and its interaction with the federal and state sovereigns with
almost no reference to any constitutional benchmarks or limitations." Pommer-
sheim, supra note 9, at 271.
268. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Clause also excludes Indians from the count
when apportioning taxes.
269. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
270. Id. at 573-74.
271. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990).
272. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
273. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
274. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
275. The Court has long deferred to Congressional power through the Plenary Power
Doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). Judge Canby
states, "Although there may be argument over the extent to which the courts may
properly limit tribal sovereignty, there has never been any doubt that congress is
legally free to do so." CANBY, supra note 41, at 85.
276. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693 ("It is significant that the Bill of Rights does not apply to
Indian tribal governments." (citing Talton, 163 U.S. 376)).
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dians, and how tribes may treat nonmember Indians.277 It is unclear
whether, without Talton, that distinction would still exist. Some cur-
rent systems, like the Courts of Indian Offenses, might not survive if
the Bill of Rights applied to all Indians regardless of tribal member-
ship. 2 78 The consequences would be far reaching and would revolu-
tionize the position of tribes in the United States.
Also revolutionary would be the power that the Supreme Court
would claim, if it were to follow this route. The Plenary Power doc-
trine is anchored in the brief text of the Indian Commerce Clause,
which announces Congress' power to regulate trade with the tribes.279
Outside of interpreting the Indian Commerce Clause, the Court's exer-
cise of power does not have even that scant authorization over tribal
sovereignty. Prominent Indian law scholars have denounced the ex-
tension of the Court's power, begun in Wheeler, and Oliphant and ex-
tended in Duro, calling it "judicial missionary work,"2 s0 "judicial
plenary power",2 S1 "a subjectivist path" where "legal traditions are be-
ing almost totally disregarded,"2s 2 "a power play,"28 3 and " a house of
cards ultimately built on a flawed constitutional thesis."2 84 Although
277. 495 U.S. at 689-90. In regard to historical evidence that federal statutes did not
distinguish between member and nonmember Indians, the Court states: "Con-
gressional and administrative provisions such as those cited above reflect the
Government's treatment of Indians as a single large class with respect to federal
jurisdiction and programs. Those references are not dispositive of a question of
tribal power to treat Indians by the same broad classification." Id.
278. Also known as CFR courts, the Courts of Indian Offenses were established pursu-
ant to 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.1-11.32c (1991) to provide enforcement for tribes whose
own systems have "broken down," and federal or state enforcement was not avail-
able. One must wonder if even the Bureau of Indian Affairs might be suspect
under equal protection principles.
279. See supra note 269.
280. Frickey, supra note 107, at 73-4.
281. Pommersheim, supra note 9, at 284. Pommersheim also calls it "a rogue doctrine
used to curb tribal sovereignty." Id. Robert Clinton also calls it "judicial plenary
power." Clinton, supra note 182, at 218. Clinton states, "Judicial Indian plenary
power apparently contains few limitations on judicial activism and creativity,
just as it failed to limit Congressional excesses during the height of American
colonialism in Indian country." Id.
282. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States'
Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 267-
68 (2001).
283. Skibine, supra note 15, at 783-84 ("Thus interpreted, the Court in Oliphant and
Duro accomplished a power play of constitutional dimension: a power play aimed
at wresting from Congress its traditional role of determining the relations be-
tween Indian tribes and the United States.").
284. Clinton, supra note 182, at 117. Clinton states the following:
[I]n the late-twentieth century, the Supreme Court has arrogated to it-
self the plenary power it previously rationalized for Congress and has
begun defining federal Indian law in an exercise of judicial plenary
power, similarly without any lawful justification. While internally con-
sistent with one another, none of these cases can be reconciled with basic
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this path to consent jurisdiction, or members-only jurisdiction, was be-
gun in Oliphant, a Supreme Court decision holding that Duro is based
on constitutional principles would make it difficult to deny the activ-
ism of this Court. The Court has always deferred to Congressional
power over the tribes, as well as other areas.28 5 Although Duro an-
nounced that Congressional power is not without limits, the Court as-
suming for itself the power to limit sovereignty would be a blatant
example of judicial activism.
There is evidence that at least one justice, Justice Anton Scalia,
recognized that Duro represented a departure from his usual judicial
philosophy. Indian law scholar David Getches found a memorandum
from Justice Scalia to Justice Brennan among the papers of Justice
Thurgood Marshall, in which Scalia, usually devoted to the plain
meaning of texts, explains his thinking in Duro.2 86 Getches describes
the memo,
A majority of the Court voted in conference after the oral argument [in Duro]
to reverse a Court of Appeals decision upholding tribal jurisdiction. Justice
Scalia originally voted to affirm. Justice Brennan, as senior dissenting Jus-
tice, assigned him the task of writing the dissent. Scalia later changed his
mind, telling Brennan "I am sorry to desert." In the course of his "efforts to
craft an opinion," he had gleaned from some recent decisions an approach that
enabled the Court to readjust tribal jurisdiction and sovereignty based on a
snapshot of current conditions and the expectations of non-members. Al-
though he "would not have taken that approach as an original matter," he
became convinced that this approach was now "too deeply imbedded in our
jurisprudence to be changed." Hence he joined in Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion, which extended the Court's denial of tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe to the more difficult ques-
tion of jurisdiction over non-member Indians. 2 8 7
Philip Frickey reflects on the incident, giving credit to Justice Scalia
for recognizing the inconsistency of this position when compared with
those for which he is famous, but worrying that the "inescapable" rea-
son for the different approach is that Scalia finds "federal Indian law
is not worth the bother."28 8
American constitutional principles, the constitutional history of the In-
dian Commerce Clause or the principles of the Anglo-American legal sys-
tem. It is a house of cards ultimately built upon a constitutionally-flawed
thesis.
Id.
285. The Court also commonly defers to Congress in areas such as military matters.
See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (stating that the court must
give highest deference to military judgment).
286. David H. Getches, Conquering The Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of
the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1575 n.4 (1996).
287. Id. (citing Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William J. Bren-
nan, Jr., Regarding Duro v. Reina (Apr. 4, 1990), available in The Papers of
Thurgood Marshall, Library of Congress).
288. Frickey, supra note 107, at 63.
20041
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
There are other arguments against following the path of members-
only jurisdiction. The consent jurisdiction rationale emphasizes the
lack of defendants' ability to participate in making the laws that gov-
ern them.28 9 But, as Justice Brennan noted in the Duro dissent, re-
quiring the possibility of participation in exchange for jurisdiction
imposes a requirement on the tribal government that we do not im-
pose on other sovereigns. 2 90 As Brennan explains, to do so would be to
hold that "a State could not prosecute nonresidents, and this country
could not prosecute aliens who violate our laws. The commission of a
crime on the reservation is all the 'consent' that is necessary to allow
the tribe to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the nonmember
Indian."2 9 1
Treating tribal courts differently than state courts and other sover-
eign courts suggests to some commentators that the true basis for con-
sent jurisdiction is distrust of tribal courts-and that the distrust is a
vestige of the racism that has darkened the relationship of the tribes
and the dominant American society.2 92 Robert Clinton notes that
ironically, this line of consent jurisdiction cases transforms the issue
into one of reverse discrimination:
In short, the exercise of federal judicial Indian plenary power is all about pro-
tecting nonmembers, primarily whites, from Indian governance! Obviously, in
a post-Brown v. Board of Education world, some non-racial explanation of this
effort was necessary in order to mask the overt racism and colonialism in-
volved in the Court's most recent foray into the world of Indian wardship,
dependency and plenary power. Duro v. Reina supplied that rationale. 2 9 3
Thus, the consent jurisdiction path is fraught with difficulties.
Justice Marshall, in Johnson v. McIntosh, recognized that regardless
of the justice of the claim, the "Courts of the conqueror" could not
deny the conqueror title.294 Although the Supreme Court does not
seem to see the irony of the "courts of the conqueror" requiring consent
from Indians, it has not escaped others. Philip Frickey has said, "The
Court has transformed itself from the court of the conqueror into the
court as the conqueror."2 95
Even if the Court finds a constitutional basis for Duro, there are
still two possible outcomes to the criminal jurisdiction and double
289. Duro, 495 U.S. at 678.
290. Id. at 707 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Nor have we ever held that participation in
the political process is a prerequisite to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by a
sovereign.").
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 182, at 222-23; see also Robert A. Williams, Jr., Doc-
uments of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Coloni-
alism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARiz. L. REV. 237
(1989).
293. Clinton, supra note 182, at 223.
294. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 588.
295. Frickey, supra note 107, at 73 (emphasis added).
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jeopardy issues. First, the Court may find, as the Eighth Circuit did,
that although the decision is based on constitutional principles, the
effect is not to void the Duro override, but instead to limit Congress'
possible reactions to Duro to delegating sovereignty, instead of recog-
nizing inherent sovereignty. If tribal sovereignty is delegated from the
federal government, then both federal courts and tribal courts share
the same source of power, and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine does not
apply. The Double Jeopardy Clause would bar successive prosecution.
Because this position still recognizes the Duro override as granting
tribal courts jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, nonmember Indi-
ans who are prosecuted first by tribal courts, where punishment is
severely limited,29 6 would not face prosecution by federal courts
where more conventional punishment is available. The tribal court
has concurrent jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act, and thus, if
the tribe prosecutes a defendant before the federal government does,
those who commit serious crimes may escape with light punish-
ment.29 7 Moreover, if the Court chooses this path, although the tribal
court will have jurisdiction over both members and nonmember Indi-
ans, nonmember Indians will not be subject to successive prosecutions
by tribal courts, but, under Wheeler, member Indians will.
The second outcome possible if the Court finds Duro to be constitu-
tionally-based is to find that the constitutional basis trumps any au-
thority Congress has to override the decision. Thus, the Duro override
would be void. This choice would solve double jeopardy problems be-
cause lacking jurisdiction over nonmembers, no tribal prosecution
would exist to interfere with federal prosecutions. But this solution
presents other practical problems-the same problems that Congress
responded to in the Duro override. If tribal courts lack jurisdiction, it
leaves a jurisdictional void on the reservation and tribes would be un-
able to protect themselves. 298 The Supreme Court in Duro suggested
that states and tribes could fill the void by means of Public Law 280 or
inter-tribal reciprocal agreements. 29 9 This suggestion seems likely to
296. The ICRA limits punishment to no more than one year in jail and $5000 in fines.
25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2002).
297. See Clinton, supra note 291and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 185-90 and accompanying text. The tribes had argued, "there
may not be any lawful authority to punish the nonmember Indian." Duro, 495
U.S. at 697. State authorities may lack the power, resources, or inclination to
deal with reservation crime. Arizona for example, specifically disclaims jurisdic-
tion over Indian country crimes. ARiz. CONST. art. 20 4. Further, federal au-
thority over minor crimes, otherwise provided by the Indian Country Crimes Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1152, may be lacking altogether in the case of crime committed by a
nonmember Indian against another Indian since § 1152 states that general fed-
eral jurisdiction over Indian country crime "shall not extend to offenses commit-
ted by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian." Duro, 495
U.S. at 697.
299. 495 U.S. at 697. The Court states:
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be unattractive, if not insulting, to the tribes, given that when
granted authority to accept or reject State jurisdiction under Public
Law 280, tribes have nearly unanimously rejected it.300 The demo-
graphic information that is currently available on the reservation pop-
ulation,3O1 and the outcry that met the Duro decision, suggest that the
jurisdictional void created by finding Congress had no authority to
override Duro will present a significant law enforcement problem for
states and tribes.30 2
In summary, if the Court finds Duro has a constitutional basis it
faces problematic choices that lead to unsettling consequences: creat-
ing a constitutional basis without a text as an anchor; overruling long
established precedent and requiring change in established systems;
creating situations where serious crimes may be punished with no
more than a fine and a year in jail; or creating jurisdictional voids that
once before led to an outcry by States and tribes concerning law en-
forcement. If the United States Supreme Court finds the decision was
constitutionally based, it opens itself to charges of judicial activism
and of exercising unauthorized power. Given the numerous negative
consequences of finding that Duro is based on the Constitution, per-
haps finding that Duro was decided as a matter of f6deral common law
is a better choice.
B. The Court Could Conclude that Duro was Decided as a
Matter of Federal Common Law
Alternatively, the Court may find that Duro is a matter of federal
common law as the Ninth Circuit did in Enas.3 03 First, and most im-
portant, there is the lack of any reference in Duro to the United
States Constitution. Second, although much in the Duro opinion sup-
ported finding a constitutional basis for the decision, there is also sub-
stantial language in Duro that supports finding the Court intended
deference to Congress and therefore, that the Court made their deci-
sion as a matter of federal common law. For example, the Duro Court
clearly states near the end of the opinion that Congress has the final
Our decision today does not imply endorsement of the theory of a juris-
dictional void presented by respondents or the court below. States may,
with the consent of the tribes, assist in maintaining order on the reser-
vation by punishing minor crime. Congress has provided a mechanism
by which the States now without jurisdiction in Indian country may as-
sume criminal jurisdiction through Pub. L. 280.
Id.
300. See supra notes 127-133 and accompanying text.
301. See supra Part I.
302. See supra notes 125-133 and accompanying text.
303. United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 674 (9th Cir. 2001) ("If there is a constitu-




authority to address the jurisdictional scheme: "If the present juris-
dictional scheme proves insufficient to meet the practical needs of res-
ervation law enforcement, then the proper body to address the
problem is Congress, which has the ultimate authority over Indian af-
fairs."3 04 Even when the Court is speaking about the nonmember In-
dians' right to the Nation's protection of their individual rights, the
Court defers to Congress by stating that "[i]n the absence of such [fed-
eral] legislation, however, Indians, like other citizens are embraced
within our Nation's 'great solicitude that its citizens be protected...
from unwarranted intrusion on their personal liberty."'305 Further-
more, most Indian law scholars agree that Duro is federal common
law and not constitutionally based.306
Just as finding a constitutional basis for Duro would entail turning
away from the Marshall Trilogy, Talton, and other well established
precedent, similarly deciding that Duro was decided as a matter of
federal common law would also entail diverging from precedent-in
this case, the modern trend to consent jurisdiction. Although Oli-
phant has been repeatedly criticized for relying on weak or mistaken
authority,3 07 the decision has formed the basis for a now long line of
cases recognizing consent jurisdiction and not territorial jurisdic-
tion.308 And for jurists, usually labeled "liberal," who often privilege
the rights of the individual over group rights or the power of govern-
mental entities, a decision away from the consent jurisdiction path
may be difficult. Those jurists who see the courts' role as protecting
the liberty of the individual must ask how it can be that within the
United States, the courts are unable to protect the civil rights of its
own citizens.309 Some scholars see this trend toward the consent par-
304. 495 U.S. at 698.
305. 495 U.S. at 692 (emphasis added) (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978)).
306. This was the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit in Enas, 255 F.3d at 674.
307. See Barsh and Henderson, supra note 141.
308. See generally Gould, supra note 15, at 899 ("It may be that little recourse is now
available to Indians and tribes. But continuing resort to the doctrines of inherent
sovereignty and trust responsibility will not remedy the problem. These doc-
trines will forever fail the tribes because they lack a textual basis in the Constitu-
tion. If the paradigm holds true, tribes will lose virtually every time they attempt
to assert inherent rights against nonmembers.").
309. Philip Frickey writes:
It is obvious that the Court has found it increasingly incongruous that
tribes, as entities within the borders of the United States subject to ulti-
mate congressional control, may use the coercive power of government
against nonmembers without being subject to all of the basic constitu-
tional limitations and remedies. This incongruity has been heightened
because in most of the cases the tribe has struggled to regulate such
persons in circumstances in which Congress long ago destroyed the
tribe's ability to exclude nonmembers and in which the region in ques-
tion may have, to Anglo judicial eyes, lost its "Indian character."
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adigm to be unstoppable.3 1o Although it is true that finding Duro was
a matter of federal common law and not constitutionally based will not
stop the trend, it would slow it down. And slowing it down may be a
too painful choice for those jurists who see their role as protectors of
individual rights.
Even if the Court finds that Duro is a matter of federal common
law, however, the Court must still apply the test for dual sovereignty
and decide whether the Duro override recognized the tribe's inherent
power, or whether the Duro override was a delegation ofjurisdictional
power. The Court may decide that Congress had the power to trump
the Duro decision, but that during the short period of time that Duro
was in force, the federal government, through the arm of the Court,
had removed inherent jurisdiction from the tribe. Once removed by
the federal government, regardless of the language or intent of Con-
gress, any restoration of jurisdiction must be a delegation. This was
the conclusion the Ninth Circuit originally reached in Means,31 1 and
later overturned in Enas.3 12
If the Court decides that Congress had only the power to delegate
jurisdiction to the tribe, the tribal court and the federal courts will
share the same source of sovereignty, and the dual sovereignty excep-
tion will not apply. As discussed above, double jeopardy principles
will require that only one prosecution take place, and, if the tribal
court acts before the federal court, some defendants may receive light
punishment for serious crimes.3 13 Member Indians and nonmember
Indians will be subject to different double jeopardy outcomes.
If, on the other hand, Congress has not only the right to decide
whether the tribe has jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, but also
has the right to recognize inherent jurisdiction, then the Dual Sover-
eignty Doctrine applies and both member and nonmember Indians are
subject to successive tribal-federal jurisdiction. This practical solution
would also avoid the problems of a jurisdictional void over nonmember
Indians, and allow the tribes to fulfill their duties to protect their own
members. It would be a striking reaffirmation of Congress' plenary
Frickey, supra note 107, at 65. David Williams makes a parallel point: "[Wie
need to believe in the possibility of a nation that can encompass and welcome all.
The reason that Indian law may stir so much anxiety may be that it tends to
place limits on the promise. And so it is an understandable impulse to claim that
the Constitution applies to Indians in the same way as it does to every other
group." Williams, supra note 15, at 869.
310. See, e.g., Gould, supra note 15.
311. Means v. N. Cheyenne Tribal Court, 154 F.2d 941, 947 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled
by Enas, 255 F.3d 662 ("The 1990 amendments must be treated as an affirmative
delegation of power ... .
312. 255 F.3d at 675 n.8.
313. See supra note 2.
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power, but would slow the advance of consent jurisdiction that the Su-
preme Court has embraced in the last twenty-five years.
In sum, this issue will present the Justices with difficult choices
that will test their fidelity to their jurisprudential philosophies, and
their decisions will have important consequences for individual Indi-
ans and for the tribes. The following section concludes this Article by
predicting how the Supreme Court will resolve the issue, as well as
suggesting the direction the Court should take.
V. CONCLUSION
Currently, under Enas, a nonmember Indian tried by a Navajo Tri-
bal Court may face a subsequent federal prosecution based on the
same facts. Simultaneously, under Lara, a nonmember Indian tried
by the Winnebago Tribal Court is protected from that threat by the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Given this situation, the United States Su-
preme Court has agreed to decide the issue. There will be a strong
temptation to reaffirm the trend to members jurisdiction, most likely
by deciding that Duro was constitutionally based and that Congress
had no power to override Duro.
The Court will likely be induced to take this approach for several
reasons. First, finding Congress could not override Duro's denial of
jurisdiction is a practical response to the double jeopardy issue. This
decision would avoid the double jeopardy problem for federal prosecu-
tors, because without tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers, there
will be no tribal prosecutions to interfere with federal proceedings.
Second, the outcome would comport with results this Court has
found acceptable before. The Court has shown in Duro that it consid-
ers the jurisdictional void created by tribal courts lacking jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians to be a solvable problem, because the tribe
can accept the State's protection under Public Law 280.314
Third, it would avoid the rationale that worried the Eighth Circuit
in Lara and Weaselhead, and the Ninth Circuit in Means: that giving
Congress the power to "recognize" sovereignty instead of delegating it
is the same thing as giving Congress the power to revise history. This
ability to "recognize" a power that Congress had not noted previously
in Indian law suggests that Congress could perhaps do the same in
other areas. The Ninth Circuit in Enas admits a major limitation to
its holding: "It cannot be the case that Congress may override a consti-
tutional decision by simply rewriting the history upon which it is
based."315 The court goes on to distinguish Enas from that situation
because Enas is not a matter of constitutional history.3 16
314. See supra notes 125-131.




Finally, and perhaps most important, a decision that Duro was
constitutionally based will continue the modern trend to members-
only jurisdiction. It will focus, as the Court has before, on whether
nonmember Indians enjoy the full protection of the Bill of Rights in
tribal court, and whether they are eligible to participate in the govern-
ment that holds them accountable for their actions in Indian Country.
Members of the Court are comfortable focusing on individual rights,
and uncomfortable with recognizing the group rights that tribal gov-
ernments represent. The Court has confirmed this principle of con-
sent jurisdiction repeatedly in the last thirty years. 3 17 It is unlikely to
abandon it now, especially in the criminal context where the interest
in protecting civil rights is high.
A decision that Duro is constitutionally based would be mistaken,
however, for the reasons that this Article sets out above: no constitu-
tional text supports the decision; it would disturb longstanding princi-
ples of Indian law, it would be seen by many as explicitly assuming
judicial plenary power over the tribes, and it would leave States and
tribes with a jurisdictional void. But there are more reasons why the
Court should reject such a decision.
First, in the criminal context the stakes are higher, not just for the
defendant, but for the tribe as well. The Court must understand that
it is the duty of the tribe, as sovereign, to protect its own members.
The Court is not contemplating another small limitation on tribes;
this denial of jurisdiction strikes at the heart of sovereignty. If mem-
bers cannot place their trust in their government to maintain peace
and order, sovereignty is a sham. It is not simply that order must be
maintained by someone, but rather that it is the tribe that must main-
tain it. More than the right of the tribe, it is the obligation and the
purpose, of the tribe. In Heath, the landmark double jeopardy case,
Justice O'Connor writing for the majority, explained:
Foremost among the prerogatives of sovereignty is the power to create and
enforce a criminal code. To deny a State its power to enforce its criminal laws
because another State has won the race to the courthouse "would be a shock-
ing and untoward deprivation of the historic right and obligation of the States
to maintain peace within their confines.
A State's interest in vindicating its sovereign authority through enforce-
ment of its laws by definition can never be satisfied by another State's enforce-
ment of its own laws. Just as the Federal Government has the right to decide
that a state prosecution has not vindicated a violation of the "peace and dig-
nity" of the Federal Government, a State must be entitled to decide that a
prosecution by another State has not satisfied its legitimate sovereign
interest. 3 1 8
317. See supra notes 214-225 and accompanying text.
318. 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (citation omitted).
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Thus, the Court's solution of tribes accepting state jurisdiction under
Public Law 280319 completely misses the point. The tribe, as a sover-
eign, has "a right to decide" whether a prosecution has vindicated or
satisfied its sovereign interest.3 20 And if that right to decide is to
mean anything, the tribe must have the right to subsequent prosecu-
tion. The fact that the tribe long ago lost the power to vindicate its
interests in the case of non-Indians does not justify further eroding
this basic right.
If the Court is concerned about the individual rights of nonmember
Indians, there are other steps Congress could take to protect those
rights. The Indian Civil Rights Act could be amended to include all of
the Bill of Rights protections. The right to appeal to the federal courts
through a habeas petition is already an established protection.
In the criminal law context, the Court routinely balances the pro-
tection of individual rights with the right of the state to fulfill its duty
to protect all of the people. If a citizen of New York commits a crime in
Philadelphia, the Court acknowledges the right of Pennsylvania to
protect its citizens by asserting jurisdiction over the New Yorker, re-
gardless of the differences in New York and Pennsylvania law and re-
gardless of the lack of opportunity for the defendant to participate in
making those laws. The tribes' right and duty to protect its members
is no different.
If members cannot rely on the tribe for that protection, member-
ship becomes trivial. In Duro, Justice Kennedy repeats the often
quoted language from United States v. Mazurie, "The tribes are, to be
sure, 'a good deal more than "private voluntary organizations"... '"321
but Duro goes on in the next sentence to limit tribal sovereignty in
what Heath calls a "shocking and untoward deprivation."32 2
A Supreme Court decision to limit criminal jurisdiction to mem-
bers-only is also wrong because it is impractical. Like the Allotment
Act that attempted to change the Indian culture by imposing individ-
ual land ownership on the tribes, the plan to limit tribal court jurisdic-
tion attempts to impose constitutional values on tribal courts. It is an
assimilationist policy, and as the failure of the Allotment Act demon-
strated, assimilation is a failed policy. 3 2 3 Congress has learned that
assimilation will not work, and the Court may expect to learn the
319. See supra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.
320. As noted earlier, the Wheeler Court recognized that "[t]ribal laws and procedures
are often influenced by tribal custom and can differ greatly from our own."
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331-32 (1978).
321. 495 U.S. at 688 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
322. 474 U.S. at 93.
323. See supra notes 43-45.
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same lesson. 32 4 Despite the devastation of the Allotment Period,
tribes have not only survived, some have begun to thrive, which leads
to the last point arguing against a decision to limit jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians.
A decision that erodes the power of Congress at a time when Indi-
ans are finally in a position to influence the political process would
undermine the democratic participation that the Court focused on in
Duro. In addition to the incongruity of the "courts of the conqueror"
requiring consent for jurisdiction, another irony becomes apparent if
the Court finds that Congress did not have the power to recognize the
tribe's inherent jurisdiction in the Duro override. For many years, the
Court has upheld the plenary power of Congress to define the limits of
tribal authority.3 25 During those years, tribal members were among
the poorest people in the nation, and the tribes were without means to
contribute to political campaigns or to pay lobbyists to represent tribal
interests. Now, with many tribes developing economic prosperity
through gaming compacts and other development projects, these
tribes are finally in a position to take advantage of the political influ-
ence that prosperity can bring.3 2 6 It would be wrong for the Court to
324. The author has been told by Native American friends that despite all efforts to
encourage assimilation, the tribes intend to survive. Frank Pommersheim has
commented on the hardiness of the tribes.
The central paradox-and certainly one a trickster figure navigating be-
tween two worlds could appreciate-of contemporary Indian law is the
strength and elan of tribal efforts in the face of the negative jurispru-
dence of the Supreme Court. Despite the inimical ethos that permeates
much of contemporary Supreme Court Indian law jurisprudence, the ef-
forts of tribes to achieve meaningful self-determination proceed apace.
Tribes seemingly grow ever more confident with their accomplishments
in developing increasingly competent and sophisticated tribal governing
institutions to better serve individuals and communities on the
reservation.
Frank Pommersheim, Coyote Paradox: Some Indian Law Reflections from the
Edge of the Prairie, 31 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 439, 480 (1999).
325. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
326. Reports of increased political clout for the tribes come from across the nation and
from both political parties. See, e.g., Casino Royale Politics, WALL ST. J., May 30,
2002, at A14, which states the following:
Indian tribes with casinos argue that gambling is the yellow brick
road to Native American economic development. The jury is still out on
that and not everyone in Indian country is so sanguine. But one thing is
undisputed: The political clout of casino tribes is sharply on the rise, and
it is beginning to purchase favors that affect other Americans.
We suspect it's no coincidence that a torrent of casino money has also
been pouring through California's politicians. The money comes from 61
tribes that have signed gambling compacts with the state and the big-
money interests that back them. According to campaign finance reports,
gambling tribes have lavished more than $40 million on state politicians
since 1995, and another $80 million on casino propositions before Cali-
fornia voters. Governor Gray Davis has received more than $1 million
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deny the tribes access to power, now when they actually have the abil-
ity to influence the system.32 7
In sum, the Court should decline the opportunity to advance the
theory of members-only jurisdiction or to limit the power of Congress
or the tribes. The Court must fashion a decision, much like it did
Wheeler, that leaves open the viability of the traditional line of prece-
dent, anchored in the Marshall Trilogy that recognized the retained
sovereignty of the tribes. Further, as the tribes gain political power, it
is important that the Court reject an activist role by deferring to con-
gressional power to recognize the inherent sovereignty of tribes. The
best choice for the Court is a rationale that acknowledges that the
source of tribal sovereignty is separate from the source of federal au-
thority; it is the inherent sovereignty that the tribes retain from pre-
colonial days.
ADDENDUM328
"Wheeler, Oliphant, and Duro, then, are not determinative because
Congress has enacted a new statute, relaxing restrictions on the
bounds of the inherent tribal authority that the United States recog-
nizes. And that fact makes all the difference."3 29 So spoke the major-
ity in United States v. Lara, holding that the source of tribal
jurisdiction is an inherent sovereignty, recognized-not delegated-by
Congress, and thus under the dual sovereignty doctrine successive tri-
bal/federal prosecutions do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the United States Constitution.330 In so holding the Court secured
the benefits mentioned in the Article above: protecting the viability of
the line of cases that recognize both the sovereignty of Indian tribes
from gambling tribes. Virtually overnight, casino-owning Indian tribes
have become one of California's most powerful political lobbies.
See, e.g., Threat to Sovereignty Sends Tribes to Capitol, WASH. POST, Sept 10,
1998, at A-03 ("Tribes never have had a stronger presence in Washington than
they do now. They made a record $2 million in campaign contributions, mostly to
Democrats, in the 1996 election and more recently have marshaled lobbyists and
public relations specialists to defend the constitutionally protected Indian sover-
eignty."); R. G. Ratcliffe, Firms Fund DeLay Bid to Capture House Seats, Hous-
TON CHRON., June 21, 2003 ("In 1995, at the request of the Mississippi Indians,
DeLay helped kill a proposed tax on Indian gambling. Since then the tribes have
become major Republican donors.").
327. In addition to the political process, other systems of influence may bring more
power to the tribes. Philip Frickey suggests that a "broader approach" to dispute
resolution, those that offer "a greater degree of conciliation" such as negotiation
or mediation, may "bring Indians into Indian law far better than does adjudica-
tion." Frickey, supra note 27, at 1782-83.
328. The Court decided United States v. Lara, ___U.S. ; 124 S. Ct. 1628 (2004), on
April 19, 2004, as this Article was going to press. This addendum will briefly
describe the opinion.
329. U. S. at ; 124 S. Ct. at 1637.
330. U.S. at __; 124 S. Ct. at 1639.
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and Congress' plenary power over the tribes, thereby acknowledging
that tribes retain some inherent tribal sovereignty that exceeds tribal
membership, and rejecting the judicial activism regarding the tribes
that scholars have denounced.331
In Lara, the Court first reviewed the history of cases addressing
Double Jeopardy and Indian tribes, arriving at the question of
whether Duro was constitutionally based and thus a decision that
Congress could not override, or whether it was federal common law
which Congress could override. The Court found that Duro was not
constitutionally based, and noted Duro, Bourland, and Nevada were
not controlling because those cases rest on "extant treaties and stat-
utes ... sources as they existed at the time the Court issued its deci-
sions. "332 Further, although the Court conceded that Duro
anticipated congressional delegation of jurisdiction, the Lara majority
found that when Congress overrode Duro, it did not delegate, but
rather it "adjusted" the status of the tribes by "relaxing the restric-
tions recognized in Duro."3 3 3
In explaining the basis for its decision, the Court went beyond en-
dorsing tribal sovereignty in the double jeopardy setting to explicating
and reaffirming the constitutional basis for the congressional plenary
power over the tribes. The Court identified the traditional constitu-
tional sources: the Indian Commerce Clause and, by implication, the
treaty power. Additionally, Justice Breyer noted that Congress' ple-
nary power has long enjoyed the Court's approval, 334 and that Con-
gress had routinely modified the autonomy of dependent entities in
other contexts. 33 5 Further, the Court reasoned that no explicit lan-
guage in the Constitution prohibited Congress acting to relax restric-
tions, and the action required no "radical changes in tribal status."33 6
The Court also, in a move reminiscent of the first Justice Marshall's
wry reference to the "courts of the conqueror,"337 stated that Congress'
power rests on "preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any
Federal Government, namely power the Court has described as 'neces-
sary concomitants of nationality."'338 This allusion to the power of the
dominant nation is not the only way in which the decision echoes the
Marshall trilogy.
331. Supra notes 266-68, 283-85, and accompanying text
332. -U.S. at _; 124 S. Ct. at 1636-37.
333. The Court listed other instances when Congress could "relax restrictions," most
notably when Congress terminated and then later recognized a tribe. Id. at 1635
( citing Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
334. __ U.S. at __; 124 S. Ct. at 1634
335. Id. at 1635.
336. Id. at 1636.
337. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
338. ___U.S. at _.; 124 S. Ct at 1634.
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Just as the cases of the Marshall trilogy simultaneously gave hope
to the tribes by recognizing Indian sovereignty apart from the states
but also undermined that sovereignty by establishing "domestic de-
pendent nation" status, the Lara Court reserved a question that may
undermine much of the victory that tribes can find in Lara. The Court
carefully explained, step-by-step, why Lara's double jeopardy claim
did not allow the Court to address the equal protection and due pro-
cess claims that a nonmember Indian might normally bring after pros-
ecution in tribal court.3 39 Clearly, the Court left open the possibility
that the sovereignty it recognized in the double jeopardy context may
evaporate in the face of other constitutional claims.
Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas all wrote
separate concurrences. Justice Stevens, concurred in both the judg-
ment and the rationale. He found "nothing exceptional" in recognizing
the inherent sovereignty of the Indian tribes that had been previously
limited because the Court had similarly acted with the states, and
furthermore the tribes were originally independent sovereigns, unlike
most states.340
Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, concurred in the outcome, but
found the majority went too far when it found a constitutional basis
for Congress' actions. 341 Kennedy would simply "take Congress at its
word," no more. 34 2 As the Article above speculated it might, it troub-
led Justice Kennedy to stray far from the consent theory that supports
the notion of members-only jurisdiction. 343 According to Kennedy,
under Wheeler it is the historic power over the tribe that justifies lim-
ited tribal sovereignty. 34 4 He found it "most doubtful" to extend the
"unique and limited character" of that historical limited jurisdic-
339. U.S. at _ ; 124 S. Ct. at 1637-39. The Court explained that the due process
or equal protection claim, if valid, would invalidate all tribal prosecutions of non-
member Indians, including Lara's. But invalidating the prosecution is not the
same as showing a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, which would require
showing a delegation of federal power. Thus, the Court stated, "we need not and
shall not consider the merits" of the due process or equal protection claim. Id. at
1638. Further, the Court found that when Lara cited Duro to raise the lack of
constitutional safeguards, he was merely re-making the due process and equal
protection claims. Id. at 1639.
340. Id. (J. Stevens, dissenting). Justice Stevens cites Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benja-
min, 328 U.S. 408, 437-438 (1946) as an example. In that case the Court wrote
that for a party to contend that "Congress' 'adoption' of South Carolina's statute
was an unconstitutional delegation of Congress' legislative power to the states
obviously confuses Congress' power to legislate with its power to consent to state
leglislation. They are not identical, though exercised in the same formal man-
ner." Id. at n.51.
341. - U.S. _ ; 124 S. Ct. 1639 (J. Kennedy, dissenting).
342. Id.




tion. 34 5 Moreover, Kennedy noted that reserving the questions of due
process and equal protection, or using the "euphemistic formulation"
of "relaxing restrictions" "obscures what is actually at stake . . . de-
mean[ing] the constitutional structure and the consent upon which it
rests ..... "346
Justice Thomas also concurred in the outcome, but not the reason-
ing of the Court.3 47 Thomas confronted the confusing jurisprudence
on tribal jurisdiction by calling for the Court to "re-examine the prem-
ises and logic of our tribal sovereignty cases." 348 Thomas identified
the source of that confusion as the tensions within Wheeler, specifi-
cally the tension between Congress' plenary power and the Indian
tribes' inherent sovereignty. 34 9 For example, Justice Thomas ob-
served that if the dual sovereignty doctrine applied because the same
offense may violate the 'peace and dignity' of each separate sovereign,
then the tribe should have sovereignty to hear all claims that violate
the 'peace and dignity' of the tribe including those committed by mem-
ber or nonmember or non-Indian.350 Unlike the dissent, Thomas finds
no constitutional basis for Duro or Oliphant.3 5 1
In contrast, the dissent, authored by Justice Souter and joined by
Justice Scalia, found a constitutional basis for Duro, because Duro
was a "question of how far a prosecuting entity's inherent jurisdiction
extends" which required an analysis that the dissent vaguely charac-
terizes as "a constitutional analysis based on legal categories of consti-
tutional dimension."3 52 The dissent cited Duro and Bourland for the
proposition that tribes retain only the jurisdiction "necessary for self
government and internal tribal affairs" and that subsequent to these
cases, jurisdiction must come from delegation.3 53 Souter reasoned
that tribal authority could be restored only by granting the tribe inde-
pendence or by rejecting the doctrine of dependent sovereignty. He
feared that the majority's opinion represented that rejection of depen-
dent status and a move toward independence. Souter observed that
stare decisis principles are "particularly compelling in the law of tribal
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. .. U.S. at _; 124 S. Ct. at 1642.
348. Id. Thomas is not the first to find the area confusing, of course. See supra notes
105-07 and accompanying text.
349. U.S. at _; 124 S. Ct. at 1642.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 1645.
352. U.S. at _ ; 124 S. Ct at 1650 (J. Souter, dissenting). "What should also be
clear, and what I would hold today, is that our previous understanding of the
jurisdictional implications of dependent sovereignty was constitutional in nature,
certainly so far as its significance under the Double Jeopardy Clause is con-
cerned." Id.
353. U.S. at _; 124 S. Ct. at 1649.
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jurisdiction, an area peculiarly susceptible to confusion."3 54 And he
fears that confusion " will be the legacy of today's decision." But the
dissent seemed less worried about principles of stare decisis regarding
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,35 5 and United States v. Kagama, 356
which it found was "not much help."3 57
And so, does Lara supply the answers to the questions posed at the
beginning of this Article: What are the limits of tribal sovereignty?
Where is the source of tribal sovereignty? Who decides the answers to
those questions? It is not surprising that only some answers are clear.
First, it is clear that in the double jeopardy context the source of
tribal jurisdiction is the inherent sovereignty of the tribe. 3 58 The lim-
its of that sovereignty now include the majority's endorsement of the
Duro override-tribes have jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, at
least the tribe has jurisdiction in the same instances that they have
jurisdiction over members. 35 9 And who decides? For the Lara major-
ity it is quite clear that Congress decides. Plenary power is back; in-
deed it is back with a vengeance and a renewed analysis of its
constitutional basis.360 Congress' plenary power over the tribes has
often been decried as an odious doctrine by both tribes and Indian law
scholars.361 But as mentioned earlier, Congress' plenary power may
be a more positive alternative than the Court's activism through mem-
bers-only jurisprudence in an era when some tribes are gaining finan-
cial and political power.3 62
Although the decision is undoubtedly positive for the tribes, it
leaves open possibilities of severe limitation in the future. The deci-
sion may be limited to the double jeopardy context in the future, and it
is unclear whether Justices Kennedy and Thomas would support def-
erence to inherent tribal sovereignty beyond that context. Even the
majority clearly reserves the question of a due process or equal protec-
tion claim brought by nonmembers tried in tribal court on criminal
charges. And Justice Souter and Justice Scalia, without textual basis
but nevertheless affirming the constitutional basis of earlier decisions
354. U.S. at _; 124 S. Ct. at 1650.
355. 5 Pet. 1, 8 L. Ed. 25 (1831).
356. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
357. -U.S. at _; 124 S. Ct. at 1649 (J. Souter, dissenting). In contrast, the major-
ity cites to one of the Marshall Trilogy, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17, 8
L. ed. 25 (1831) (cited by Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1636).
358. U.S. at " 124 S. Ct. at 1639.
359. __ U.S. at ; 124 S. Ct. at 1636.
360. U.S. at ; 124 S. Ct. at 1639.
361. See generally Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. BAR
FOUND. RES. J. 1; Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources,
Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984); Robert N. Clinton, Isolated
in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and
Self-Government, 33 STANFORD L. REV. 979, 1053 (1981).
362. See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
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limiting tribal jurisdiction, remain firmly on the path of members-only
Indian law jurisprudence.
Yet, the Court has stated that the Duro override "enlarges the
tribe's own 'powers of self-government," 36 3 and that the basis of the
tribes jurisdiction is inherent sovereignty. The tribes are unlikely to
call this any less than a victory.
363. -U.S. at _; 124 S. Ct. at 1632 (emphasis in original).
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